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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND AUTONOMOUS SELF-
DEFINITION*
Mark P. McKenna-
Arnold Schwarzenegger recently sued a company that was marketing a
machine gun-toting bobblehead doll made in his image.' Schwarzenegger
claimed that the producer was free-riding on the value of his image, violating
his right of publicity.2 But where the Terminator turned Governor of
California saw an attempt to exploit his hard-earned reputation, others saw
valuable political speech intended to parody Schwarzenegger.3 The case
ultimately settled,4 but not before drawing attention to the breadth of the
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1. Oak Prod. v. Ohio Disc. Merch., No. SC081563 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2004).
2. The right of publicity generally is defined as the right to prevent commercial use of one's
identity. 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2000). The right
is concerned primarily with uses of an individual's identity (her name, likeness, or some other identifiable
feature) to sell products or services, or in some cases, as the product itself. Because the "right of publicity"
terminology is a result of an artificial distinction in the law's conception of the harm of identity
appropriation, I use "right of publicity" in this article only when referring to particular claims recognized
by the positive law. I refer generically to claims regarding commercial uses of identity as "identity
appropriation claims."
3.
What part of the word "parody" does Governor Schwarzenegger not understand? One of the
wonderful things about democracy is that we are able to ridicule and belittle our politicians. When
politicians wield so much power it is a good thing to keep their egos somewhat in check with
humorous renditions of their features. I see little reason why a 3D spring-mounted bust should
receive less First Amendment protection than a political cartoon.
Ernest Miller, Lawsuit Launched Over Schwarzenegger Bobbleheads, at http://www.corante.
com/copyfight/archives/003723.html (May 18, 2004). Notably, the company that produced the
Schwarzenegger bobblehead also produces bobbleheads in the images of many other political figures,
apparently without any objection from those individuals. See O.D.M., Inc. (offering bobbleheads of Tom
Daschle; Laura, Barbara, George H.W. and George W. Bush; Jesse Jackson; John Kerry; Rudy Giuliani;
and Hillary Clinton; among others), at http://www.bosleybobbers.com (last visited May 28, 2005).
4. See "Arnold Schwarzenegger Terminates Bobblehead" (discussing terms of the settlement, by
which the producer was allowed to continue making gun-free Arnold bobbleheads), at http://www.bobble-
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current right of publicity, which has expanded to allow claims against an ever-
increasing range of conduct.5 As critics of Schwarzenegger's case recognized,
his was only the latest in a long line of (often successful) attempts by
celebrities to extend the claim's boundaries.6 And there is no end to that trend
in sight; one can discern no principle in the current doctrine or its dominant
theory on which any limitation might be based.7
Because the right of publicity has focused entirely on the economic value
of a celebrity's identity, courts considering claims have no basis to
differentiate among the variety of ways in which others might exploit that
value. They cannot, for example,justify treating uses that evoke the President
of the United States differently from those that evoke Britney Spears. Nor can
they explain why the use of Schwarzenegger's picture on the cover of a
magazine should be treated differently than the sale ofbobblehead dolls made
in his image. All of these uses are intended to exploit value and could, as an
a priori matter, fall within the ambit of the right of publicity.8 Indeed, courts
by and large have refused to draw the one distinction a theory based on
heads.com/bobbleheads/amold-terminates-bobblehead.html (last visited May 28, 2005).
5. Since the right of publicity is a state common law and/or statutory claim currently recognized
by twenty-eight states, there is no single "right of publicity" claim. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6:3. I use
the singular in this article because there is increasing uniformity among the various formulations, and there
is near unanimous agreement at the theoretical level. In fact, the differences between the various versions
of the right of publicity tend to relate to the claim's scope, including whether the right is descendible or the
extent to which the First Amendment restricts its application, rather than its existence or its justification.
In the few situations where there are substantial differences among formulations, I will attempt to note the
differences.
6. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 365-74 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1106 (2004) (upholding plaintiff's claim against use of a character name in a comic book series
that was based on the name of a former hockey player); Comedy IM Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21
P.3d 797, 799-801 (Cal. 2001) (allowing holder of rights of publicity of actors who portrayed the Three
Stooges to assert a claim against t-shirts bearing reproduction of Saderup's charcoal drawing of the Three
Stooges).
7. See Justin Levine, California's Ridiculous (and Unconstitutional) "Right of Publicity" (I told
you so folks) (arguing that the Schwarzenegger case demonstrates that the right of publicity is "on a
collision course with the First Amendment" since one "cannot meaningfully distinguish between politicians
and other forms ofpublic figures"), at http://www.socallawblog.com/archives/001505.html (Apr. 30, 2004).
8. Some versions of the right of publicity would explicitly exempt from liability "newsworthy" uses
like depictions of Schwarzenegger on magazine covers. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 1997)
("U]se of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs,
or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is
required."); Stephano v. News Group Publ'n, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584-85 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that
publications concerning newsworthy events or matters of public interest do not constitute uses in "trade"
or for "advertising purposes" as used in N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1997)). These
limitations, however, reflect a recognition of the potential impact of the right of publicity on core First
Amendment values and are not based on any limiting principle in the theory of the right of publicity.
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economic value is capable of drawing-between claimants whose identities
have value and those whose identities do not.9
Some critics have blamed the uncertainty in Schwarzenegger's case, and
the growth of the right of publicity generally, on courts' failure to recognize
and apply a clear and robust First Amendment defense that would limit the
claim's reach.' Surely a healthy dose of the First Amendment is in order.
Broader recognition of such a defense, however, would not cure all that ails
the right of publicity: it owes its existence as an "independent" claim to a
constrained view of the harm caused by identity appropriation and a simplistic
distinction between celebrities and non-celebrities.
The right of publicity is described as a descendant of the right of
privacy." The notion of privacy as a legal right dates to Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis and their 1890 article The Right to Privacy.2 Warren and
Brandeis wrote their famous article with a particular abuse in mind-the
press's habit of publishing private facts or private photographs. 3 Disturbed
by this trend, the authors attempted to make the case for a new claim based
9. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4:16 ("Majority view: non-celebrities have a right of
publicity.").
10. See Eugene Volokh, Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment (arguing that Schwarzenegger
should lose his case on First Amendment grounds, but acknowledging uncertainty about the outcome), at
http://volokh.com/2004_04_25_volokharchive.html# 108339068847029941 (Apr. 30, 2004); see also F.
Jay Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The "Transformativeness" Test for Analyzing a First
Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work ofArt, 27 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 1 (2003-2004); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and The Right ofPublicity, 40 HOuS. L. REV.
903 (2003) (discussing difficulties with the California Supreme Court's test for transformativeness).
11. Section 1:7 ofMcCarthy's treatise is titled, appropriately enough, "'Publicity' law develops from
'privacy law."' MCCARTHY, supra note 2; Michael Madow, Private Ownership ofPublic Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 167 (1993) ("The right of publicity was created not so
much from the right of privacy as from frustration with it."); see also Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of
Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1199,
1203-15 (1986) (detailing history).
12. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890);
see also MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1:4 (citing the Warren and Brandeis article as the first historical
landmark in publicity and privacy rights).
13. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 196.
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip
is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued
with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are
spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column
is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.... It
belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations
of a people.
Id. at 196.
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explicitly on an individual's right to be "let alone,"' 4 a notion they believed
was implicit in existing case law. Warren and Brandeis recognized that most
people would not suffer identifiable economic harm as a result of the
publications they targeted, but they nevertheless felt money damages were an
important remedy. Thus, much of the article is devoted to making the case for
emotional harm as a compensable injury. In the years thereafter, courts
overwhelmingly fixated on the fact that the invasions Warren and Brandeis
targeted caused "hurt feelings" of some sort and assumed that "hurt feelings"
were the gravamen of a privacy claim.
Having embraced this conception of privacy directed at "hurt feelings,"
courts sensibly could expand the concept to cover identity appropriation
claims by non-celebrities who might want to avoid attention. Celebrities,
however, actively seek and profit from attention and courts and commentators
therefore assumed that they suffer no hurt feelings from receiving publicity,
regardless of its form. Thus, privacy claims were unavailable to celebrities,
and they needed some other claim to prevent commercial uses of their
identities. 5 The right of publicity was created specifically to meet that need.
Of course, having concluded that the privacy theory was inapplicable to
celebrities, supporters of the right of publicity could not claim that the new
claim vindicated any emotional interests. As a result, they distinguished the
right of publicity from privacy claims on the basis of the economic value of
celebrity identities. 6
14. Id. at 193, 197.
15. In his landmark article, The Right of Publicity, Melville Nimmer made the case for an
independent claim by detailing the inadequacies of privacy law and other possible claims for addressing
what he perceived as the "needs of Hollywood." Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
16. A recent Supreme Court of Missouri case provides a typical description of the two strands of
existing law. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). The court wrote:
The tort of misappropriation of name is one of four recognized torts falling under the general
heading of invasion of privacy. The interest protected by the misappropriation of name tort "is the
interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity, in so far as it is represented by his
name or likeness, and in so far as the use may be of benefit to him or others." Recently,
development of the misappropriation of name tort has given rise to a separate yet similar tort termed
the "right of publicity," which is said to "protect a person from losing the benefit of their [sic]
working creating a publicly recognizable persona." Though facially similar, the protections
afforded by each tort are slightly different: "the [misappropriation of name tort] protects against
intrusion upon an individual's private self-esteem and dignity, while the right of publicity protects
against commercial loss caused by appropriation of an individual's [identity] for commercial
exploitation.... Despite the differences in the types of damages that may be recovered, the elements
of the two torts are essentially the same. To establish the misappropriation tort, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant used the plaintiffs name without consent to obtain some advantage. In
a right of publicity action, the plaintiff must prove the same elements as in a misappropriation suit,
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On closer examination, the distinction between celebrity and non-
celebrity interests has been dramatically over-emphasized. First, courts and
commentators accepted too easily that identity appropriation claims by private
citizens were a simple extension of the privacy rationale advanced by Warren
and Brandeis. Although private citizens suffer harms of exposure from
commercial uses of their identities that are similar to the harms caused by
traditional invasions of privacy, they also suffer a qualitatively different, and
more important, harm. The things and people with which individuals choose
to associate reflect their character and values. An individual's choices
therefore can be viewed as the text of her identity, and unauthorized uses of
a person's identity in connection with products or services threaten to recreate
that text and affect the way the individual is perceived by others. The
individual uniquely bears the costs of those perceptions, both emotional and
economic, and she therefore has an interest in controlling the uses of her
identity. Importantly, this interest in autonomous self-definition is just as
relevant for celebrities as it is for non-celebrities.
Second, courts' refusal to allow celebrities' privacy claims was based
upon an unwarranted conclusion that the only type of compensable "hurt
feelings" were those that resulted from publicity generally. Courts dismissed,
to the extent they considered, the possibility that one might suffer hurt feelings
from particular forms of publicity, even if she accepted publicity in other
forms. In this regard too, celebrity and non-celebrity interests in controlling
uses of their identities are quite similar.
The failure of courts and commentators to appreciate these common
interests put the onus on them to justify the independent right of publicity on
the basis of economic value. Most courts have not attempted to meet that
challenge and have simply assumed that the economic value of a celebrity's
identity should be allocated to the celebrity. 7 Those that have articulated a
normative basis for such an allocation almost uniformly have relied on a
with the minor exception that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant used the name to obtain
a commercial advantage.
Id. at 368-69 (internal citations omitted). As a practical matter, the only difference between the two types
of claims is that right of publicity cases generally are brought by celebrities, while non-celebrities bring
privacy claims, sometimes together with a publicity claims, to the extent they bring claims at all.
17. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should WeBe Paying
Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights ofPublicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 127-28
(1996) ("In fact, the decisions [regarding the right of publicity] do not tend to include justifications for
placing what is, after all, called a public image, within the plenary control of private individuals. Rather,
the courts tend to assume that, if someone hones an image, that person generally has the right to capture
the benefit of all its uses.").
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version of Lockean labor theory endorsed by the majority of commentators.18
According to the Lockean theory, the economic value of identity should be
allocated to the celebrity because the value is primarily the result of the
celebrity's labor. On the basis of that justification, the right of publicity is the
beneficiary of overwhelming support. 9 Sheldon Halpern has even argued
that:
Forty years of judicial and legislative effort have produced a coherently defined and
rather clearly enumerated independent right of publicity protecting the economic
associative value of identity. With limited (if not idiosyncratic) dissent, the development
was fostered and encouraged by legal scholarship. Debate over policy limitations and
boundaries was thoughtful and productive and had largely come to an end with the
maturation of the right of publicity.20
Halpern, unfortunately, is correct that dissent with respect to the right of
publicity has been limited and that legal scholarship has contributed to the
current condition of the law. But the right of publicity is anything but
coherent.
Despite the labor theory's widespread acceptance, it has very little
explanatory power with respect to current law. More importantly, the labor
theory fails as a normative justification of identity ownership because it gives
celebrities much more credit than they deserve for creating the economic value
of their identities.2 Even if celebrities do play a role in creating the value of
18. Cf Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DuKE L.J.
383, 388 (1999) ("Both proponents and critics of the right of publicity generally perceive it as a property
claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.").
19. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1:4; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right ofPublicity: Maturation
of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 853
(1995) ("After forty years of wandering in a definitional wilderness, the right of publicity appears to have
reached the promised land of independent status, a distinct right and remedy unmoored from privacy....");
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1997) ("This article contends that once the historical,
sociological, and cultural influences are duly considered, the right-of-publicity's place in our legal system
becomes more defensible, both theoretically and practically."); cf. Madow, supra note 11, at 133-34
("[T]here is a solid, indeed an overwhelming, consensus within the American legal community that the right
of publicity is a good thing.... [T]his 'initial phase of questioning' was brought to a close much too hastily
20. Halpern, supra note 19, at 869 (footnotes omitted). Notably, Halpern cites as evidence of the
"thoughtful and productive" debate over the right of publicity only two cases regarding the descendability
of the right of publicity under Tennessee law. Id. at 869 n.72 (citing Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc.,
Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979)). Neither case analyzes the theoretical
foundation of the claim itself.
21. Thus, critics of the right of publicity rightly have assailed the labor theory as a basis for
allocation of all economic value to the celebrity. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, But He Shouldn't
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their identities, there is no need to allow them to capture all of that value:
Complete dominion over one's identity creates little, if any, marginal
incentive for the individual to develop one's skills. 22 Consequently, the right
of publicity, in its current form, stands on shaky ground.
Nevertheless, critics of the right of publicity have gone too far in
suggesting that celebrities should have no control over their identities. 23 All
individuals have a legitimate interest in autonomous self-definition, and
celebrities deserve protection against uses of their identities that implicate that
interest. This article offers a framework for an autonomy-based identity
appropriation claim, which is both more theoretically sound and capable of
identifying the boundaries of a legitimate claim.
Be: The Right of Publicity Revisited, 1992 BYU L. REv. 597, 598 (rejecting conventional justifications
of the right of publicity and arguing that trademark law provides adequate protection of any legitimate
interest); Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity ""eel" Spun Out of
Control, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 329 (1997) (rejecting a right of publicity claim that does not require proof of
likelihood of confusion); Madow, supra note 11 (arguing that right of publicity has not been adequately
justified in light of its consolidation of the power to make cultural meaning).
22. On this point, critics of the right of publicity have had some unlikely allies. In The Economic
Structure of Intellectual Property Law, William Landes and Richard Posner express general skepticism
about a Lockean theory of intellectual property. They argue that the creation of all intellectual property is
a cumulative process and, as a result, the extent to which such works realistically can be considered the
exclusive fruit ofanyperson's laboris unclear. More specifically, Landes and Posnerreject an instrumental
version of the labor theory in the context of the right of publicity, as they correctly note that allocating the
economic value of identity to celebrities provides minimal incremental encouragement to invest in
becoming a celebrity. WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRuCTuRE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 223 (Harvard University Press 2003).
23. Madow, for example, grossly overstates the cultural consequences of the right of publicity in
several important ways. First, his discussion rests on the assumption that recognition of publicity rights
concentrates the power to make cultural meaning in those who already control image making. In fact, many
of the would-be users of celebrity identity are large corporations, advertisers, and other media entities
responsible for significantly greater "meaning making" than individual celebrities. Thus, if the goal is
decentralization of image making, stronger rather than weaker publicity rights might be called for, at least
in some cases. Cf Justin Hughes, "Recoding'" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests,
77 TEX. L. REv. 923,935 (1999) [hereinafter Hughes, "Recoding'] (noting that right ofpublicity plaintiffs
are often individuals taking on large corporations). Second, if Madow correctly describes the process by
which symbolic meaning is created-if meaning is the result of a collective social process and individual
choices (a bottom-up rather than a top-down process)-then law would seem incapable of concentrating
meaning making. The law cannot control individual responses to celebrity images and, for the most part,
it does not try. Individuals responding to the information projected by celebrities may not be able to express
their received meaning commercially, but the law will not limit or define the meaning ofcelebrities to them.
Finally, even if we assume that the law is capable of concentrating cultural meaning making, the right of
publicity is an ineffective mechanism by which to control meaning as long as it allows claims only against
commercial uses of identity, as traditionally understood (a requirement courts admittedly have not always
observed carefully). A rule prohibiting all commercial use of celebrity identities would limit most of us
very little. See id. at 947 (noting the many examples of recoding that have not been circumscribed by
existing law).
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Part I of this article explores the history of identity appropriation claims
and their roots in privacy law. It identifies more precisely the harms targeted
by Warren and Brandeis and compares those harms to the ones caused by
commercial uses of identity, finding significant differences. Part II critiques
the prevailing theories of the right of publicity. It exposes the disparity
between the theories and the claim's actual shape, and shows each of those
theories to be normatively inadequate. Part I reunites celebrity and non-
celebrity identity appropriation claims, distinguishing both from the privacy
claims Warren and Brandeis anticipated, and discusses the contours of a
theoretically justifiable identity appropriation claim based on an interest in
autonomous self-definition.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY'S UNEASY EVOLUTION FROM THE
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The right of publicity gives individuals claims against unauthorized
commercial use of their identity.24 The paradigmatic right of publicity claim
targets the use of an individual's name or likeness in advertising for the
defendant's products or services,25 but the scope of the claim has broadened
along multiple axes. First, "identity" is now broadly construed to include
almost any attribute associated with an individual, including a distinctive
voice,26 a phrase associated with an individual, 27 and even a character the
individual has portrayed.28 In some cases, the attributes claimed need not even
24. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1:3.
25. Despite its name, New York's statutory right of privacy, which preempts any common law right
ofpublicity, is akin to a right of publicity claim since it allows living persons a claim against use of their
"name, portrait, picture or voice" for "advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade." See N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney 1992); Stephano v. News Group Publ'n, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y.
1984) (recognizing preemption of the common law right of publicity by N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 and
51). "Portrait or Picture," however, has been liberally interpreted to include look-alikes. See Onassis v.
Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), aftid, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985) (granting Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis a preliminary injunction against use of a look-alike
in an advertisement despite the fact that no actual picture or portrait of Ms. Onassis was used, and stating
that the New York statute "is intended to protect the essence of the person, his or her identity or persona
from being unwillingly or unknowingly misappropriated for the profit of another").
26. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (challenging use ofa soundalike in
commercial advertising on the ground that claimant had a distinctive voice); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849
F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the defendant's use of a soundalike version of a Bette Midler song
was sufficient to support a right of publicity claim by Midler).
27. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 810 F.2d
104 (6th Cir. 1987) (challenging use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" for portable toilets).
28. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (challenging on right of
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be unique to the plaintiff if the context of the use is sufficient to evoke that
person.29 Second, courts have prohibited a variety of uses that traditionally
were not regarded as commercial in nature, such as the use of the Three
Stooges' pictures on t-shirts, ° the use of Rosa Parks's name as the title of a
song,3' and the use of a former hockey player's name as a character in a comic
book series.32
Many observers have been troubled by this expansion, but it should not
have come as a surprise. The growth of the right of publicity was a
predictable consequence of its singular focus on protecting the economic value
of commodified identity, which can be exploited in a variety of ways. Since
the centrality of economic value was a direct result of courts' rejection of
privacy in the context of celebrity identity appropriation, understanding the
right of publicity necessarily begins with the right of privacy.
publicity grounds an airport restaurant's licensed use of animatic robots based on actors' characters on the
Cheers TV show); McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1994) (challenging use of "Spanky
McFarland" name for restaurant, as well as the use of the image of the actor who portrayed "Spanky" in the
Our Gang television series).
29. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (challenging advertiser's
use of a robot with a blonde wig standing next to game show board on the ground that it called to mind
game show hostess); see also McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4:45 (arguing that persona should be understood
as signifying the "cluster of commercial values embodied in personal identity as well as to signify that
human identity 'identifiable' from [its] usage").
30. Comedy I Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (finding artist's charcoal
sketch of the Three Stooges violated the actors' rights of publicity when printed on t-shirts or otherwise sold
commercially).
31. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversing grant of summary judgment
in favor of band OutKast and allowing Rosa Parks to pursue a claim for use of her name as the title of a
song).
32. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 372-74 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1106 (2004) (recognizing right of publicity claim by former hockey player Tony Twist against use of a
character called Anthony "Tony Twist" Twistelli in a comic book series). That case adopted a test that
weighs the expressive quality of a use of an individual's identity against its commercial purpose and would
preclude a First Amendment defense where individual literary devices have little literary value, considered
in isolation, compared to its commercial value. To those concerned about traditionally protected forms of
speech, the case, like the Parks case, is startling. But the cases should not be surprising. A claim grounded
in nothing more than economic value has no self-limiting mechanism. Speech, just as competitive use,
unquestionably can impact value. Without a more thorough theory of identity protection, one must hope
for a much more vigorous First Amendment defense than courts have allowed. But see ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915,938 (6th Cir. 2003) (denying Tiger Woods's right ofpublicity claim under Ohio
law, and finding that defendant's limited edition prints featuring Woods were protected by the First
Amendment); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing parody defense to right of publicity claim under Oklahoma law).
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A. Publicity's Progenitor-The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy claim is widely attributed to Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis and their groundbreaking article The Right to Privacy.33
Concerned that the law offered no remedy against publications of private facts
or photographs, Warren and Brandeis attempted to make the case for a claim
against those abuses that was based explicitly on an individual's right of
privacy. Famously, the authors claimed that the proposed right was aimed at
protecting "the right to enjoy life-the right to be let alone."34 Concerned that
their proposal might appear radical, Warren and Brandeis attempted to portray
this new right as a mere extension of existing law. Specifically, they claimed
that a number of cases purportedly decided on other grounds, such as breach
of trust or common-law copyright, really represented efforts to protect an
author's expressions of her thoughts and feelings-elements of her personality
that Warren and Brandeis believed should be recognized separately and
protected directly.
Warren and Brandeis focused most of their attention on the protection
afforded unpublished works of authorship. At common law, courts granted an
author the right to control the conditions under which her work would be
published, if it was published at all, ostensibly as a property right justified by
the labor expended by the creator of a work.35 Thatjustification was plausible
enough with regard to deliberate literary works such as novels or plays, but it
offered little support for protection of casual letters or diaries.36 Yet those
types of works often were the beneficiaries of protection against unauthorized
publication, despite the fact that they entailed only "trifling" amounts of
labor,37 particularly as compared to the amount of effort it took to lead a good
life. Warren and Brandeis argued:
If the amount of labor involved be adopted as the test, we might well find that the effort
to conduct one's self properly in business and in domestic relations had been far greater
33. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
34. Id. at 193-95.
35. See EATON S. DRONE, ATREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS
IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 1-53 (1879); Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren andBrandeis:
Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 659 (1991).
36. Post, supra note 35, at 659.
37. See id. (citing Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912)).
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than that involved in painting a picture or writing a book; one would find that it was far
easier to express lofty sentiments in a diary than in the conduct of a noble life.38
Indeed, confronted with the weakness of the labor theory as ajustification
for protection of unpublished works, the common law was unable to identify
the exact nature of the labor involved in intellectual production and tended to
"speak instead of 'originality' as the true grounds of 'the title of the
property."' 39 Moreover, "the common law was prepared to concede that
originality was less a matter of intellectual effort than of expressing 'the mind
of a creator or originator.'"" Since personal appearance, sayings, acts, and
personal relations are similar expressions of personality, Warren and Brandeis
suggested that the law should protect those as well.4" This general right to be
let alone, when considered with all of its applications, "is in reality not the
principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality.
42
Unfortunately, Warren and Brandeis felt compelled to spin their new
claim out of old cloth. By arguing that the privacy rationale was implicit in
existing case law, the authors may have made the new claim more palatable
to contemporaries, but they failed to lay a normative foundation for the claim.
The independent privacy principle they touted was not an inevitable extension
of the cases upon which they relied. To be sure, those cases fit their
conventional justifications rather poorly. With respect to common-law
copyright protection in particular, Warren and Brandeis had indeed exposed
"the disparity between the accepted justification ... of the claim and the
actual shape of the law."'43 Yet, establishing that particular cases could not be
explained by their traditional justifications falls short of affirmatively
demonstrating the normative premises on which those decisions were actually
based.
Ultimately, Warren and Brandeis conflated the distinct issues of whether
the law ought to protect personality and how the law should protect it (i.e., as
property or as a personal privacy claim).44 Even if the prevailing justification
38. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 207.
39. See Post, supra note 35, at 660.
40. Id.
41. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 204-06 ("If, then, the decisions indicate a general right
to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations, these should receive the same protection, whether
expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial expression.").
42. Id. at 205.
43. Post, supra note 35, at 660.
44. Id. at 662 ("Warren and Brandeis evidently believed that once common law copyright was forced
to recognize its roots in personality, it would necessarily shift its foundation from property to privacy.").
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for treating unpublished works as property seemed untenable, it did not
necessarily follow that personality theory was the only viable alternative, or,
even if it was, that such a personality interest could not be protected as
"property." '45 Rather than seeking to vindicate some personality interest,
common-law copyright protection could just as plausibly have been intended
to secure for the author the right of first publication so that she could be
certain to capture the economic value of her work. No such certainty would
be possible unless the author retained exclusive rights in the unpublished
work.
Even the fact that the common law afforded protection to works that the
author had no expectation of ever publishing did not render obvious a
personality theory of common-law copyright protection. Very often an author
does not know when or if she will publish a particular work, and the law might
well reserve those decisions to the author at a later time. With respect to
writings like diaries, the types of works we might most reliably conclude were
never intended to be published, Landes and Posner have suggested that
copyright protection still acts instrumentally to induce production of valuable
works.46 According to their theory, the law should encourage production of
diaries and private memoirs because they may have value to biographers and
historians. Unless an author has confidence that the law will prevent others
from publishing the works if the works fall out of her physical control, she
might not produce the work at all.47 Those who produce despite the risk of
publication might take inefficient defensive steps to prevent publication.48
These alternative justifications for common-law copyright are not
necessarily more persuasive than the personality theory. They are, however,
possibilities that Warren and Brandeis failed to discount sufficiently. Instead,
Warren and Brandeis simply asserted that no instrumental economic theory
could support a property claim: "To deprive a man of the potential profits to
be realized by publishing a catalogue of his gems cannotper se be a wrong to
him. The possibility of future profits is not a right of property which the law
ordinarily recognizes . . . ."' Whether that statement was descriptively
accurate at the time Warren and Brandeis wrote, it was normatively empty.
The authors offered no reason why the possibility of profits might not be the
45. As Post noted, the choice of the mode of protection is not one inherent in "personality" itself.
See id at 662-63.
46. See LANDES& POSNER, supra note 22, at 131-35.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 204.
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basis of a property claim, and modem experience suggests that claims very
often are based on the possibility of future profits. Most jurisdictions, for
example, now recognize claims for tortious interference with prospective
business relations, which, whether or not they can be characterized as property
claims, essentially protect an interest in the possibility of future profits.5 °
Likewise, modem copyright law in many ways seeks to protect the possibility
of earning future profits, both by securing to the author the exclusive right to
make derivative works and by denying a fair use defense to individuals whose
uses might have an effect on the market for hypothetical future derivative
works made by the author of the original work.5'
Warren and Brandeis's failure to make a thorough normative case for the
privacy claim stems in large part from their struggle to accommodate the
formalist tradition of their time. As previously noted, protection for
unpublished writings traditionally had been regarded as a property-based
protection. At the time Warren and Brandeis were writing, the
characterization of the claim as "property" was particularly significant
because the remedies available for a claim depended on its classification. For
property and contract claims, only pecuniary injuries were compensable.5 2 If
the claim they proposed really was akin to common-law copyright protection
for unpublished works, then unless common-law copyright claims could be
reclassified as something other than property claims, the authors' new claim
could well have been seen as a property claim for which only pecuniary
injuries were compensable. This would have been a disaster, because Warren
and Brandeis recognized that most of the individuals who would assert these
privacy claims would suffer only emotional, and not economic, harm from
violations of their privacy.
Notably, Warren and Brandeis did not intend simply to offer a claim for
"hurt feelings." The claim they espoused was aimed at a particular set of
harms whose victims were unlikely to suffer damages that could be 'measured
in terms of lost profits or other economic costs. Constrained by existing
forms, their only option was a "personal" claim. Thus, more than attempting
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (1977) (tortious interference with prospective
contractual relations).
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,590 (1994)
(noting that, in assessing fair use, courts are to "consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the
particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also 'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort
engaged in by the defendant ... would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market' for
the original. The enquiry.'must take account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market
for derivative works."') (internal citations omitted).
52. DRONE, supra note 35, at 107, 114-15, 486, 535; Post, supra note 35, at 665.
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to restrict the privacy claim to cases in which the victims suffered emotional
damages, Warren and Brandeis simply recognized that many of the
prospective plaintiffs in the privacy actions they advocated would not be able
to identify economic damages.53 The claim could not hinge on economic
damages then, or it would be worthless to most of the individuals they
imagined would suffer the types of injury about which they were concerned.
Nevertheless, the belief that privacy claims necessarily were limited to
claimants who suffered hurt feelings has haunted the development of identity
appropriation claims since those claims were first recognized.
Finally, because Warren and Brandeis's main task was to draw parallels
between the expressions of personality protected by existing law and those
manifested in the actions for which Warren and Brandeis sought protection the
authors' explanation of the way in which publication of private pictures or
written descriptions of private facts violated a personality interest left much
to be desired. Though the article includes abundant rhetoric about how such
publications shocked and dismayed their subjects,54 it is strikingly superficial
in its explanation of why those transgressions are so harmful. That omission
was unfortunate, because the claim they proposed seems to have encompassed
a variety of different interests. According to Ruth Gavison, the "privacy"
Warren and Brandeis sought to protect was comprised of at least "three
independent components": "secrecy, anonymity, and solitude." 55 Time has
not brought greater clarity: "Privacy" has become one of the broadest
concepts in the law, used to denote the interest at stake in such wide-ranging
contexts as abortion,56 improper search and seizure,57 confidentiality of
medical information," and even third-party use of personally identifying
information.59 As this wide array suggests, courts generally have failed to
53. See Warren& Brandeis, supra note 12, at 219 ("An action oftort for damages in all cases. Even
in the absence of special damages, substantial compensation could be allowed for injury to feelings as in
the action of slander and libel.") (internal footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 196.
55. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980).
56. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy... is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
57. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,370 (2003) ("The long-prevailing standard ofprobable cause
protects 'citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of
crime,' while giving 'fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection."').
58. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (setting national standards for privacy re individually identifiable health information);
Department of Health and Human Services, Subchapter C, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164.
59. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000) (prohibiting
collection of certain personal information from children).
[Vol. 67:225
2005] THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND AUTONOMOUS SELF-DEFINITION 239
define with any greater particularity the harms they sought to prevent under
the privacy rubric, and scholars have not approached any consensus as to the
meaning of "privacy" as a legal concept.60
Despite confusion about the relatedness of the various actions called
invasions of privacy, it is relatively easy to identify the interest Warren and
Brandeis sought to protect. They were concerned about publication of private
facts or private photographs because those uses exposed information about an
individual. Individuals are harmed by newspaper accounts of their exploits,
regardless of how the information was collected,6' because such accounts
expose aspects of the individual's personality to the world, allowing others to
peer into that person's soul.62 In Gavison's terms, public disclosure of private
information destroys "secrecy, anonymity, and solitude."63 Publication of
60. Jeremy Waldron uses Wittgenstein's "family resemblance" concept in describing the nature of
"property." JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 49-50 (Clarendon Press 1988).
According to Waldron, the term "property" refers to a number of conceptions of an abstract idea with no
necessary components. Thus, various things that might be referred to as property share enough common
traits that they can be recognized as having a "family resemblance," but each also has distinct
characteristics. Id. The same might be said about notions of "privacy," except that, if the objects of
property may be thought of as siblings, the various conceptions of privacy are only like cousins, sometimes
distant ones. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1093-1124 (2002)
(cataloging unsuccessful attempts to create a workable definition of privacy and evoking the family
resemblance concept of privacy).
61. Warren and Brandeis believed that many disclosures were doubly harmful in that the information
disclosed often "can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle." Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 12, at 196. Because claims based on physical intrusions do not implicate First Amendment concerns
as severely as other forms of privacy claims, today it is those intrusions that generally give rise to any
privacy claims that celebrities have. See McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5:100.
62. The interest I describe corresponds loosely to what Post refers to as "descriptive privacy," one
of the two different types of privacy he finds in the Warren and Brandeis article. According to Post,
descriptive privacy aims to surround the person with "a buffering space of 'solitude and privacy' to insulate
emotions and sensations from the world." Post, supra note 35, at 650-51. Privacy is lost "as others obtain
information about an individual, pay attention to him, or gain access to him." Id. at 651. Normative
privacy, by contrast, refers not to an objective physical space of secrecy, solitude or anonymity, but rather
to the forms of respect that we owe each other as members of a common community. Id. Post argues that
the intrusion and public disclosure branches of the privacy tort identified by Prosser came to depend entirely
upon normative rather than descriptive conceptions of privacy because the types of intrusions or disclosures
the law would sanction depended on normative judgments of the reasonable person. Id. at 653. I do not
adopt Post's formulation because I am not sure that "descriptive" and "normative" privacy can be neatly
separated. It may be true that whether the law allows a remedy for certain invasions has come to depend
on assessments of reasonableness in that the law asks whether the reasonable person would be offended by
a particular use. But that is a question of whether there is a remedy, not whether the claimant suffered
harm. Disclosure of private facts does not cause harm because of community norms; the exposure itself
is a violation, even if some are willing to tolerate it. Whether a particular disclosure causes a harm for
which the law will provide a remedy is a separate question.
63. Gavison, supra note 55, at 428.
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private photographs causes similar harms; it destroys anonymity, and it might
expose aspects of one's personality by capturing some of that person's
activities, thereby destroying secrecy and solitude.'
By failing to identify how publication of private facts or photographs
violated an individual's interests, Warren and Brandeis's article left courts
without a normative lodestar against which to measure other alleged invasions,
including identity appropriation. Without such guidance, courts were unable
to resist the gravitational pull of formalism as they viewed identity
appropriation through the privacy lens.
B. Privacy and Non-Celebrity Identity Appropriation Claims
While courts initially were somewhat reluctant to recognize a stand-alone
right to privacy,65 the claim found its greatest early acceptance in the context
of commercial use of a private citizen's identity.66 In Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co.,67 for example, the court recognized a general
right to prevent uses of one's likeness in connection with commercial
advertising.68 The defendant in that case used Pavesich's picture in an
64. This description of the harm caused by the invasions Warren and Brandeis targeted should not
be misunderstood as a blanket endorsement of their claim. Indeed, it is far from clear that exposure of one's
personality is, in all circumstances, something the law should prevent. In addition to the obvious value of
public knowledge of the true personalities of certain individuals, a value even Warren and Brandeis
implicitly acknowledged in creating an exception for public figures, truthful exposure may have positive
incentive effects. Specifically, the chance that one's character might be exposed may influence individuals
to behave better. Cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 141 ("Knowing in advance that copyright
protection for [unpublished works] was weak might induce him to behave better, thus raising social
welfare.... This is one of the reasons for doubting that privacy is always a social good."). Moreover, even
if privacy is a social good, to the extent it seeks to preserve "secrecy" of information, it seems incompatible
with the First Amendment in at least some of the situations in which it is most likely to be invoked.
65. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902) (rejecting
plaintiff's privacy claim based on defendant's use of plaintiffs likeness in lithographic print containing
advertisements. The court states that
[a]n examination of the authorities [including those on which Warren and Brandeis relied] leads us
to the conclusion that the so-called 'right of privacy' has not as yet found an abiding place in our
jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the doctrine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence
to settled principles of law by which the profession and the public have long been guided.
Id.
66. Ironically, given the ease with which courts and commentators accommodated identity
appropriation claims within the privacy rationale, Warren and Brandeis did not mention commercial use
of one's identity as one of the harms to which they were responding.
67. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
68. Commentators regularly have identified Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), as the first case to recognize the right of publicity as a distinct cause of action.
That is misleading. Haelan Laboratories, Inc., was the first case to recognize a property-based identity
[Vol. 67:225
2005] THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND AUTONOMOUS SELF-DEFINITION 241
advertisement for insurance services together with a statement suggesting that
Pavesich had secured insurance with the company.69 That use violated
Pavesich's privacy because "[tjhe form and features of [Pavesich] are his
own.... Nothing appears from which it is to be inferred that [he] has waived
his right to determine for himself where his picture should be displayed in
favor of the advertising right of the defendants."7 The court was concerned
that Pavesich's sensibilities would be shocked if he saw "his picture displayed
in places where he would never go to be gazed upon, at times when and under
circumstances where, if he were personally present, the sensibilities of his
nature would be severely shocked."'"
Echoing Warren and Brandeis, the Pavesich court claimed that protection
against advertising uses belonged to the same class of rights as protection for
literary compositions.72 The defendant's use of Pavesich's identity violated
Pavesich's privacy because it infringed on his right to be let alone, leaving
him with "wounded feelings."73 Specifically, the court thought that the root
of the violation was the plaintiff's loss of control over the extent to which he
remained a private person, stating that "[o]ne who desires to live a life of
partial seclusion has a right to choose the times, places, and manner in which
and at which he will submit himself to the public gaze."74 Like the actions
targeted by Warren and Brandeis, commercial use ofPavesich's image caused
a harm of exposure. His ability to live in seclusion, or at least his ability to
control the degree to which he lived in seclusion, was taken from him. As a
private citizen, commercial use of his identity destroyed his anonymity and
solitude.75
Despite its conclusion that the defendant's advertising use simply was
analogous to other violations of privacy, the court's discussion reflects its
recognition of a unique harm to Pavesich. In addition to the harm of exposure,
commercial use of Pavesich's identity associated Pavesich with the defendant
appropriation cause of action explicitly for celebrities, who found themselves without a remedy for the same
types of uses of their identities for which private citizens could assert privacy claims. It was not, however,
the first case to recognize a claim based on unauthorized commercial use of identity. As the Pavesich case
demonstrates, cases recognizing claims by private citizens against such uses were decided much earlier.
69. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 79.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 80.
72. Id. at 79-80.
73. Id. at 76.
74. Id. at 70. The plaintiff in Pavesich was an artist but "in no sense a public character." Id at 79.
The court anticipated that a different, less absolute right might be thought appropriate in the case of public
characters, but even then was disinclined to deny protection on that basis.
75. Gavison, supra note 55, at 428.
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and the defendant's services, likely in ways that Pavesich would not have
wanted. The court focused on the fact that the defendant's use of Pavesich's
identity would be "displayed in places where [Pavesich] would never go to be
gazed upon. 76 The use
contain[ed] a likeness of [Pavesich] that his friends and acquaintances would readily
recognize as his, and the words of the publication printed under the likeness were put into
the mouth of him whose likeness was published. It was, so far as his friends and
acquaintances were concerned, the same as if his name had been signed to the printed
words.1
7
Thus, the court recognized that the harm caused by commercial uses of
identity overlaps with, but is distinct from, the harm caused by traditional
invasions of privacy. Identity appropriation, unlike publication of
photographs, can create associations between an individual and the
commercial user of her identity that might impact the way the individual is
perceived. That harm is very similar to the reputational harms that
traditionally have given rise to defamation and libel claims,7" but it was
dramatically underappreciated by later courts and commentators, virtually all
of which focused exclusively on the "hurt feelings" caused by the loss of
"secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. 79
C. Privacy's Inadequacy for Celebrity Identity Appropriation Claims
Despite the fact that Warren and Brandeis never intended to restrict
privacy claims to those who suffered only "hurt feelings," as opposed to
economic harm, courts came to accept as a matter of black letter law that hurt
76. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80.
77. Id. at 81.
78. The Courtin Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), while rejecting
a right of privacy claim against use of an individual's picture in advertisements, allowed for the possibility
that such uses might support a libel claim. "The law protects the person and the purse. The person includes
the reputation. The body, reputation, and property of the citizen are not to be invaded without responsibility
in damages to the sufferer." Id. at 446. The defendant's use in Roberson did not qualify as libelous, and
advertising uses infrequently will. First, advertising uses generally contain only implicit suggestions about
the individual rather than explicit statements. Thus, it may be difficult to describe them as "false," as they
must be to trigger defamation liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558 (elements of
defamation) and 581A (discussing falsity requirement and when statements are deemed false). Second,
advertising uses may or may not "tend to harm the reputation of [the one whose identity is used] as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
Id. § 559.
79. Gavison, supra note 55, at 428.
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feelings of a very particular kind were a critical element of privacy claims,
including those claims based on commercial use of a private individual's
identity. Under that view of privacy, courts were unable to offer remedies to
celebrities when they began bringing claims for commercial uses of their
identities, as their feelings generally were not hurt by the exposure. 0
In O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,"' the court rejected Davey O'Brien's
privacy claim, which was based on the defendant beer producer's use of
O'Brien's photograph on a promotional calendar.82 Because the court
believed that a privacy claim was a personal one for which "hurt feelings"
were a necessary element, it did not believe that O'Brien's privacy was
violated. 3 O'Brien was a well-known college football player who had
actively sought media attention for his football ability through his college's
publicity office.84 As a result, the court believed that he was accustomed to
publicity and could not have suffered hurt feelings as a result of the beer
company's use of his photograph.85 Notably, the court believed that "hurt
feelings" was an all-or-nothing proposition. It did not consider the possibility
that O'Brien's feelings might have been hurt by the defendant's particular use
of his identity rather than the fact of additional publicity generally. 6
Unfortunately, rather than rejecting the simplistic approach of cases like
O'Brien and identifying more precisely the harm caused by identity
appropriation, courts and commentators viewed those cases as examples of
why the right of privacy was ill-fitting for claims by famous people
accustomed to receiving attention.87 Commentators generally have continued
80. See, e.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 1952) (rejecting a privacy
claim made by a football player against a league that televised his games because, as a celebrity, he did not
generally seek solitude and privacy; indeed, the concurrence noted, it was the one thing celebrities do "not
want, or need").
81. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
82. Id. at 170.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 169.
85. Id. at 170.
86. It was not the only court with such a narrow view of the potential harm of exposure. See
Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (W.D. Okla. 1938), rev'don other
grounds, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939) (holding that movie stars employed by plaintiff had waived their
right to privacy); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (1938) (holding that plaintiff, an actress,
had surrendered her right of privacy). In other cases, courts have avoided making broad statements about
waivers of privacy and have limited a waiver to, for example, greater distribution of a performance to which
there was originally consent. See Chavez v. Hollywood American Legion Post No. 43, 16 U.S.L.W. 2362
(U.S. Feb. 3, 1948) (holding that boxer who participated in public boxing match waived his right of privacy
as to that fight), cited in Nimmer, supra note 15, at 206.
87. See Nimmer, supra note 15, at 204-05.
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to accept this view of privacy. As one stated more recently, "[t]here is sharp
internal contradiction in the position of a plaintiff who alienates and
objectifies her image and simultaneously claims that it is integral to her very
identity in the manner presupposed by the tort of appropriation.""8
The status of identity appropriation claims as personal claims constrained
courts' ability to use privacy doctrine to redress commercial uses of
celebrities' identities in other contexts as well. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc.
v. Topps Chewing Gum Inc., a baseball card producer brought a claim against
Topps, a competitor that was making cards depicting the same players that
Haelan depicted on its cards. 9 The players had granted Haelan the exclusive
right to use their images, but then violated the agreement by allowing Topps
also to use their images on cards. 90 Haelan wanted to prevent Topps from
using the players' images, but privacy offered no recourse. The right to
privacy was a personal right incapable of assignment, and the players'
agreement with Haelan therefore amounted to nothing more than a waiver of
their rights of privacy as against Haelan. 9' Haelan had no interest in the
identities themselves. As a result, without a new property-based right, Haelan
would not have been able to enforce against Topps the rights it believed it had
acquired from the players.92 The court's recognition of the right of publicity
as an independent property-based claim in that case can be explained at least
in part as a matter of perceived necessity, driven by unnecessary formal
restraints.93
Once the new claim was unmoored from its privacy roots, courts and
commentators were forced to search for an independent normative premise for
the new right of publicity. As I have noted, many of the courts that have
recognized an independent right of publicity have done so with little or no
discussion of the claim's theoretical premise, often simply asserting that the
claim is a property claim or making bare unjust enrichment claims. To the
88. Post, supra note 35, at 677.
89. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868-69 (2d Cir. 1953).
90. Id. at 867.
91. Id. at 869.
92. Id. One might legitimately question whether such a result could have been avoided merely by
declaring the exclusivity clause enforceable, notwithstanding the personal nature of the privacy claim. Of
course, that might not have been an entirely satisfactory result; even if the clause was enforceable as a
matter of contract law, it might not have enabled the card company to secure an injunction against its rival.
93. Here is an example of why some legal realists have referred to formalist arguments
disparagingly. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REv. 809 (1935) (referring to formalism as "transcendental nonsense"); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431,443 (1930) (charging that formalist reasoning "is
in terms of words; it centers on words; it has the utmost difficulty getting beyond words").
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extent they have attempted to justify the claim, courts overwhelmingly have
relied on a labor or incentive-based theory of property rights endorsed by the
majority of commentators. More recently, other commentators have offered
alternative justifications of the right of publicity, including ones based on
Kantian property theory94 and allocative efficiency. 95 The next section briefly
outlines the various arguments made in support of the right of publicity and
exposes each of those arguments as unable to explain current law and,
ultimately, as normatively inadequate.
II. BUILDING AN "INDEPENDENT" CLAIM: NORMATIVE & QUASI-
NORMATIVE APPROACHES
A. The Property Shortcut
Cases like Haelan Laboratories, Inc. reflect courts' struggles to find a
vehicle through which to provide a remedy to celebrities for commercial uses
of their identities. Since they were unable to rely on privacy rationales, courts
embraced a property theory, believing that was the only alternative to the
personal privacy claims they rejected. 9 Unfortunately, calling the new claim
"property" has not led to clarity. To say that, due to formalist constraints,
celebrity identity must be protected as a property right if it is to be protected
at all only begs the question: Should a celebrity have a right to prevent uses
of her identity? As Wendy Gordon stated in a somewhat different context,
"[i]t may be clear that others have a prima facie duty not to take what is yours
for their own benefit, but it is still necessary to decide what is yours and what
is theirs."97 That threshold question is not resolved simply by calling identity
"property"; the label merely represents a legal conclusion as to the nature of
the rights that should be afforded to certain interests (e.g., the right to use, to
exclude, and to transfer). There is nothing inherent in the notion of property
that logically requires that all of the constitutive rights in the bundle be
94. See Haemmerli, supra note 18.
95. See LANDES& POSNER, supra note 22; Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right
of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97 (1994).
96. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 10:7 (citing cases from California, Georgia, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin). In that regard, the right of publicity has come full circle, as it has
"generally assumed the very characteristics of common law copyright from which Warren and Brandeis
sought to differentiate the personal right of privacy." Post, supra note 35, at 667.
97. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1546 (1993).
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marshaled in favor of identity, and the law could easily provide only some,
and even entirely different, protections.9"
In this respect, Prosser is correct when he says that "[i]t seems quite
pointless to dispute over whether such a right is to be classified as 'property.'
If it is not, it is at least, once it is protected by the law, a right of value upon
which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses."99 Identity appropriation
claims were categorized as property claims only as a consequence of historical
formal constraints, and Prosser correctly notes the "property" label itself is not
a justification for protection, nor does it say anything about the scope of the
right. But refusing to engage those who claim that identity is property cedes
too much ground. The property label has proven quite powerful, so much so
that courts, and even some commentators, have short-circuited analysis of the
appropriateness and/or scope of protection and offered no more of a
justification for the claim than that identity is "property.""10
98. I realize that this statement implicitly accepts the modern, disaggregated view of property that
has been the subject of some recent criticism. Adam Mossoff, for example, argues for an "integrated"
theory that regards certain rights attendant to property not as arbitrary but essential to a coherent notion of
property. See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371
(2003). The integrated theory, however, derives from natural rights theories of property. Where, as here,
natural law cannotjustify exclusive appropriation of the object to which rights are claimed, property rights
of any form are inappropriate. See infra Section II.C. Thus, my view of the nature of property is largely
immaterial to this discussion.
99. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960) (footnote omitted).
100. In his treatise, McCarthy collects a number of cases and statutes classifying the right ofpublicity
as a property right. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 10:7. But, as he makes clear in an earlier passage,
the thinking about the right of publicity remains shrouded in uncertainty and designed to achieve particular
results.
The right of publicity is properly seen as a species within the genus of "unfair competition" law.
The right of publicity is also correctly viewed as a form of "property"-and more particularly, as
a form of "intellectual property." In addition, infringement of the property right of the right of
publicity is a commercial "tort." To complete the closure of the semantic circle, it is that
commercial tort which is named "unfair competition." Thus, the right of publicity shares aspects
of both the law of property and the law of torts. It all depends upon one's point of view. If one
looks at it from the point of view of plaintiffs right, the right of publicity is clearly "property"
capable of being licensed and of being "trespassed" upon. If one looks at it from the point of view
of the defendant's "wrong," invasion or infringement of the right of publicity is clearly a "tort of'
unfair competition.
See id. § 3:1. In other words, we call the right property only because we want to allow transfer, and
"property" is the right label to achieve that result.
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The property label has also played an important rhetorical role.' 1o Calling
identity "property" has allowed courts to dodge not only the question of
whether identity deserves protection at all, but also difficult issues regarding
the proper scope of identity appropriation claims, as they apparently believed
that the label was dispositive of the scope of protection identity should be
afforded.0 2 Even Professor McCarthy, despite quoting Justice Cardozo's
warning to beware of the "tyranny of labels" and cautioning that the
"property" label not be used as a substitute for thought,"0 3 falls prey to the very
formalism that has made the law incomprehensible: "[t]he fact that the law
bestows upon the right of publicity the label 'property' has obvious
implications as to its ability to be transferred and sued upon by the
transferee.""
It might be true that identity is sufficiently similar to other objects the law
regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the
traditional bundle of property rights. But far too few courts and commentators
have offered a theory as to why any of the traditional property justifications
lead to that conclusion. Such approaches are reflective of the general
imprecision that has plagued the right of publicity.
B. Unjust Enrichment
Since remedies for property claims historically focused on redressing
economic harm and not emotional harm, some commentators have suggested
that the basis for property-based protection is to prevent unjust enrichment.
According to supporters of this theory, the focus is not as much on the
101. Supporters ofbroad rights of publicity are no different from other intellectual property claimants
in relying on the rhetorical power of "property." In fact, as a historical matter, the property label's
connotation of legitimacy played a large part in the transformation of the public debate regarding
intellectual property. See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy
of Property Rights andIdeal Objects, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 46 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002) (quoting Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose,
The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, J. ECON. HIST. 10, No. 1, 16 (May 1950) ("[T]hose who
started using the word property in connection with inventions had a very definite purpose in mind: they
wanted to substitute a word with a respectable connotation, 'property,' for a word that had an unpleasant
ring, 'privilege."')).
102. See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports and Exports, Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 325 (6th
Cir. 2001) ("We believe that the weight of authority indicates that the right of publicity is more properly
analyzed as a property right and, therefore, is descendible."); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp
1339, 1361 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding the estate had an economic interest in future ability to generate income
from property rights associated with deceased singer).
103. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 10:8 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934)).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
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plaintiff as on the defendant's "free riding." This approach adds little to mere
assertions that identity is property. Unjust enrichment is an empty concept;
it assumes an entitlement on behalf of the plaintiff to prove such an
entitlement should exist. A defendant is only "free riding" (and his
enrichment therefore "unjust") if one assumes that the value of identity
belongs to the plaintiff in the first instance. The assumption of initial
ownership must itself be supported by some theory.° 5
Thus, statements like "[n]o social purpose is served by having the
defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market
value and for which he would normally pay,"'016 offer little guidance other than
to reflect an implicit assumption about entitlement to the value.'0 7 Whether
some object will have market value for which someone else would normally
pay depends entirely on whether the law protects the object. Absent legal
protection for identity, an advertiser normally would not pay to use it. Thus,
we cannot conclude that there is no social purpose in allowing a defendant to
make use of an identity freely without determining why we should allocate all
of the value of that identity to the individual.'08 If no compelling theory calls
for such an initial allocation, then protecting identity would only allow
celebrities to earn an undeserved profit by charging others to use their identity.
Precisely for this reason, intellectual property disciplines generally
recognize a strong default rule in favor of copying,' making it incumbent on
105. Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 124 ("To my mind, courts are too quick to equate value with
right; to leap from recognizing that consumers attach value to trademarks to concluding that trademark
holders ought to have the right to capture that value for themselves.").
106. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326,331 (1966), quotedin Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576
(1977).
107. Cf White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) ("Saying Samsung 'appropriated' something of White's begs the question: Should White have
the exclusive right to something as broad and amorphous as her 'identity?"').
108. Cf Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 144 ("But there is an element of circularity in relying on
commercial morality as the basis for creating exclusivity. After all, where there is a right to copy, so-called
piracy is not immoral. It is only after it is determined that the norm is exclusivity that copying will appear
to be wrongful.").
109. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) ("In general, unless
an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.");
Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 F.3d 1034, 1042 n.20 (1 th Cir. 1996) ("However, public policy favors
competition by all fair means, and that encompasses the right to copy, very broadly interpreted, except
where copying is lawfully prevented by a copyright or patent .. ") (citing In re Deister Concentrator Co.,
289 F.2d 496, 503-06 (C.C.P.A. 1961)); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231
(1964).
What Sears did was to copy Stiffel's design and to sell lamps almost identical to those sold by
Stiffel. This it had every right to do under the federal patent laws. That Stiffel originated the pole
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the one who would claim property rights to justify exclusivity." ° Supporters
of the "value" and "unjust enrichment" theories offer no such justification but
instead turn the default rule on its head and seek to shift the burden to the user
of an individual's identity to demonstrate why its use should be allowed.
Sheldon Halpern, for example, argues that questions about whether a celebrity
deserves to capture all of the economic value of her identity, and even
discussion of whether there is any public benefit from commercial exploitation
of celebrity, are entirely irrelevant."' The law, Halpern argues, should focus
only on the fact that the identity has value and should prevent "scavengers"
from using it: "The question is not whether the celebrity 'deserves' the
benefits of celebrity. The real question to ask one who connects the persona
of another with a commercial undertaking is 'why are you doing it?""....2 But
Halpern' s only explanation for why the third-party users are "scavengers" less
entitled to use the identity is that, as between two undeserving parties, the
celebrity is the only one with a "colorable connection" to the identity."3
lamp and made it popular is immaterial. Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent
or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the
consuming public is deeply interested.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 231 (internal citations omitted).
110. Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 142-43 ("The more fundamental problem, however, is that there is
no normative principle that equates value and private right. To the contrary, black letter law is that
everyone is free to copy... [D]epartures [from the general rule] occur for instrumental reasons."). Dreyfuss
is correct that the general rule is that everyone has a right to copy and that, in other areas of intellectual
property, departures from that general rule can be explained as necessary instrumental measures designed
to enhance social welfare. That is not to say that departures from the general rule could not be justified on
other grounds, for example, a "just desert" moral argument, only that departures must be justified on some
ground. To date, no such ground has been adequately presented for celebrity identity appropriation claims.
111. Halpern, supra note 19, at 872.
112. Id.
113. Id. Actually, Halpern offers this argument as a fallback position. His first argument is that, in
the context of the right of publicity, the contest is not between two equally deserving parties since the
would-be user simply intends to profit from its use.
In short, whether or not there is some moral or public benefit from commercial exploitation of
celebrity, we are not asked to choose between the rights of the public at large and a fortuitously
placed individual; the choice is between the individual to whom that associative value attaches and
a stranger to the process who would make money out of it.
Id. The contention that the latter is somehow less deserving simply because it would use the identity to
make money is not compelling. After all, given the conventional justification for the right of publicity as
protecting the celebrity's commercial interests, it seems clear that the parties are often simply fighting over
which one of them should exploit the identity commercially. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) ("For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons
(especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.").
Halpem's argument that the law should allocate the value to the one with some connection to the identity
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Widespread recognition of the rule for which Halpern argues would undo
a number of basic intellectual property rules including, for example, the rule
that laws of nature and abstract ideas cannot be patented.114 If the law
assigned value to the one with a "colorable connection" to it, Einstein would
have been able to patent the theory of relativity, which undoubtedly would
have had commercial value if it was patented.'15 Indeed, in analyzing the
theory's patentability, the only relevant question for Halpern would have been
why the commercial user wanted to use the formula. The answer, of course,
would be that the formula is valuable and useful. Fortunately for inventors
throughout the world, patent law rejects that simplistic approach." 6 "Value"
is not allocated simply to one with a colorable connection to it; it is allocated
according to a more robust theory of allocation.
C. Labor's Indeterminacy
Those who have attempted to articulate a more thorough normative basis
for allocating the value of identity predominantly have focused on an
individual's expenditure of labor in relation to her identity. 7 Labor argues
for ownership of identity on two related theories, both of which harken back
to the central Lockean premise that an individual's labor gives rise to her
claim of exclusive property rights,' 8 and advocates of a labor theory tend to
alternate imprecisely between them. On one account, ownership of identity
is intended to carry the day even if he concedes that neither is "deserving" of the value in a strong sense.
He argues that, "[e]ven if, at its lowest level, the choice is that between two sets of scavengers trading on
the ephemera of fame, logic and fairness would seem to compel favoring the scavenger who has at least
some colorable connection to the phenomenon." Halpern, supra note 19, at 872 (internal citations omitted).
114. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable).
115. In truth, the theory of relativity, just like celebrity identity, has significant value regardless of
whether one party has exclusive rights to it. That value is simply shared by all the users rather than
concentrated in one owner. I set aside, for the moment, the argument that the total value is diminished or
destroyed (or at least not maximized) in the long run absent some form of property rights. See infra Section
ll.D.
116. Copyright law does as well. See Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(rejecting the "sweat of the brow" doctrine and denying copyright protection to unoriginal compilations of
facts); see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLuM. L. REV.
272,280 (2004) ("Databases lacking this originality remain economically valuable, but as a result of Feist,
they probably cannot be granted protection pursuant to the copyright power.").
117. Nimmer, one of the most influential commentators in the right of publicity's infancy, espoused
a labor theory in support of an independent claim. See Nimmer, supra note 15, at 216.
118. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27, at 288 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
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is based on an individual's moral claim to "the fruits of his own industry free
from unjustified interference." '119 Supporters of this version conceive of the
celebrity's identity (or at least its value) as a product of the celebrity's labor,
which is the moral source of the celebrity's claim. One commentator
described this policy consideration as "the very raison d'etre for the existence
of the right of publicity as distinct from the right of privacy."12
The other account is instrumentalist. It suggests that one is justified in
claiming property rights in the fruits of her labor not solely (or maybe not at
all) because she has some moral claim, but rather because recognizing the
right to exclude others encourages individuals to expend labor productively
and ultimately enhances social welfare.' 2' This instrumental theory of
protection traditionally is articulated as a basis for patent and copyright
protection, and the Supreme Court seemingly endorsed it in the context of the
right of publicity in its only decision involving the claim; Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co. 1
22
It is important, however, that labor fit into some larger justification of
property rights because labor is not self-evidently significant. Indeed, as
former-Professor and now Supreme Court Justice Breyer argued in his well-
known article The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, few individuals in a capitalist
society capture the entire economic value of their labor. 23 That is not
necessarily immoral because the difference can be passed along to consumers
119. Steven J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right ofPublicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 11, 116
(1980) (quoting Palmer v. Schonhom Enter., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967)).
120. Id.
121. Tom Palmer suggests that natural rights arguments and utilitarian arguments in favor ofproperty
rights are not entirely distinct because, while utilitarian arguments are explicitly consequentialist, natural
rights theories tend to contain "buried assumptions" regarding human flourishing or attainment of man's
natural end that, depending on one's definition of human flourishing, tend to mirror utilitarian goals.
Palmer, supra note 101, at 80 n.5. That may be true, but there are unique objections to each version in the
context of identity.
122. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). That case offers little
guidance as to the appropriate scope of the right of publicity. First, the Court failed to appreciate the
difference between the value of Zacchini's performance and the value of his identity apart from the
performance. To the extent the Court was concerned with protecting Zacchini's creative investment in his
performance, the case could have and should have been resolved on copyright grounds. Second, the Court
distorted its own precedent on the question of commercial use. By relying on the fact that the defendant
showed Zacchini's entire performance, the Court inverted the commercial use test by focusing on the
economic interests of the plaintiff rather than the nature of the defendant's use. Finally, the Court's belief
that the defendant's use of the entire performance in a newscast would adversely affect the market for that
performance seems as empirically questionable, if unlikely to recur.
123. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 285-86 (1970).
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in the form of lower prices. 124 Even in the case of commercial use of identity,
allowing third parties to use celebrity identities in advertising without having
to compensate the celebrity might reduce the costs of advertising and lead to
lower prices for consumers. Thus, labor is significant only if identity
ownership is compatible with a moral or instrumental theory.
Ultimately, however, both versions of the labor theory overstate an
individual's role in the creation of any economic value in her public persona.
Each version is also subject to particular objections. First, Lockean labor
theory, construed non-consequentially, does not support a moral claim to
ownership of intangible property. Second, the instrumental labor theory is
inadequate because the existence of property rights in identity creates little or
no marginal incentive to do anything. Finally, neither version of the labor
theory fits tightly with the doctrine that has developed.
1. Labor Theories Overstate the Individual's Role in Value Creation
Both accounts of labor's relevance to a right to prevent unauthorized use
of identity claims assume that individuals create the value of their identity and
therefore attribute to the individual all of the value of a particular persona.
That assumption is, at best, a gross oversimplification.
Fame is complex and paradoxical, a phenomenon for which labor is
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. In some instances, an individual
with a public persona has indeed worked to create that persona, making
professional and lifestyle choices aimed at developing a particular look or
image. But that is certainly not true of every celebrity. For every Tiger
Woods, who not only has worked hard at perfecting his golf game but also at
cultivating a marketable public image, there is a Kato Kaelin, whose celebrity
has more to do with the particular time and circumstances in which he has
found himself than with any intentional act on his part.'25 Many others
become famous simply because of their position in the world,'26 either by
accident of birth or through other familial relations.'27 Moreover, even for
124. Id. at 286. For that reason, I do not accept the suggestion that individuals have some moral
claim to property rights in intangible property simply because they create social value. See Justin Hughes,
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 305 (1988) (articulating a "value-added" labor
theory of desert).
125. Langvardt uses Kato Kaelin, O.J. Simpson's former houseguest, as a prime example of the
accidental celebrity. Langvardt, supra note 21, at 445.
126. Members of the British Royal Family, particularly Princess Diana's two sons, William and
Harry, come to mind as protypical examples of those famous by accident of birth.
127. I have in mind here previously private individuals who marry celebrities or those who become
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those who do expend time and resources on developing a persona, the truly
unique image is rare.'28 Virtually every celebrity owes at least part of her
persona to people and cultural images that have gone before her, elements of
which she relies on to build public recognition and appreciation.' 29 Thus, even
for those celebrities who consciously attempt to create an image, persona
bears the marks of incremental creation. 30
More specifically, even if individuals have some responsibility for
creating their personas, they are much less directly responsible for creating the
value of those personas. While a celebrity may have some control over the
particular image she projects, the value of her persona depends on a complex
array of social dynamics involving elements of the celebrity's own work and
the public's reaction. 31 For this reason, many well-known athletes and actors
have been unable to parlay their success in their native fields into valuable
celebrities.
128. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is
genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the
works ofthose who came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.");
Gordon, supra note 97, at 1556-57.
129. Dreyfuss's Madonna reference may have been drawn from Rosemary Coombe, who discusses
Madonna and also notes Prince's debt to Jimi Hendrix and Elvis Costello's to Buddy Holly. Rosemary J.
Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders,
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 371 (1992).
130. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 4 (arguing that labor theory is inadequate as a general
theory of property in intangibles because all intellectual products are the result of incremental creation).
131. Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 142 (arguing that purveyors and audience are co-creators of
personas). Some courts have recognized this dynamic, as has the Restatement. See, e.g., Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979) ("The so-called right of publicity means in essence that
the reaction of the public to name and likeness.., endows the name and likeness of the person involved
with commercially exploitable opportunities.") (emphasis added). The drafters of the Restatement
recognized that celebrities do not deserve all of the credit for the value of their identities.
The rationales underlying recognition of a right of publicity are generally less compelling than those
that justify rights in trademarks or trade secrets. The commercial value of a person's identity often
results from success in endeavors such as entertainment or sports that offer their own substantial
rewards. Any additional incentive attributable to the right of publicity may have only marginal
significance. In other cases the commercial value acquired by a person's identity is largely
fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment made by the individual, thus diminishing the
weight of the property and unjust enrichment rationales for protection. In addition, the public
interest in avoiding false suggestions of endorsement or sponsorship can be pursued through the
cause of action for deceptive marketing. Thus, courts may be properly reluctant to adopt a broad
construction of the publicity right.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 46 cmt. c (1995). The recognition has mostly been lip
service, however, as, with the exception of a few recent cases implicating the First Amendment, it has
generally not dissuaded courts from awarding all of the value to the celebrity.
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commercial endorsements. 132 Unlike physical objects, which have utility apart
from what others will pay for them, the value of identity is almost entirely
contextual. That is, the value of a particular identity consists of "market
value" as opposed to "use value." That distinction is important because, even
if one accepts Locke's controversial assumption that labor makes up a large
portion of use value,'33 market value is determined externally and has little
relationship to the amount of labor an individual has expended. Even for
those celebrities closest to the Tiger Woods end of the spectrum, a significant
portion of the market value of their identities is attributable to factors other
than their labor. Indeed, in determining the constituent parts of an identity's
value, the particular combination of the celebrity's labor, on the one hand, and
the public reaction, on the other, is likely impossible to measure.
Nevertheless, the law allocates to her the entire value of her persona. Perhaps
there is a good reason for such an allocation (maybe it is needed to induce
effort, even if it is no guarantee of success), but the reason cannot be simply
that the celebrity expended some labor.'34
2. Lockean Property Theory Offers No Support for a Moral Claim Against
Identity Appropriation
The need for an institution of private property, for Locke, derives from
humans' need for sustenance and self-preservation. "[H]uman sustenance,"
as Jeremy Waldron says, "is the raison d'8tre of property."' 35 It was for our
preservation, according to Locke, that God created the abundance of the Earth
and made it susceptible to satisfying human needs. The Earth's plenty, of
course, cannot serve its purpose if individuals cannot make use of it, and the
nature of physical resources precludes simultaneous use by multiple people.
Thus, for humans to make productive use of the physical materials God
132. Madow quotes Jack Nicholson's line: "Only that audience out there makes a star. It's up to
them. You can't do anything about it.. . Stars would all be Louis B. Mayer's cousins if you could make
'em up." Madow, supra note 11, at 178.
133. LOCKE, supra note 118, § 40, at 296, § 43, at 298.
134. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality andReputationalInterests of Constructed
Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 151,
162-63 (2001) [hereinafter Preserving Personality]. Kwall notes that, even "when a celebrity borrows from
the cultural fabric in creating her persona [which, in my view, is virtually always], it is still the unique
combination of the past and the celebrity's original contributions that give the persona its present appeal."
Id. Encouragement of that unique contribution could be a rational basis for protection, if protection of
identity was necessary to induce creation. But, for the reasons discussed below, I do not believe protection
is necessary.
135. WALDRON, supra note 60, at 216.
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provided, individuals must appropriate the materials exclusively. 36 A system
of private property was necessary in order to determine how to allocate
rivalrous objects in the face of conflicting claims. 137  Labor, according to
Locke, was the solution; it was the morally significant act that made exclusive
ownership acceptable and made clear who should prevail in the case of
conflicting claims.'38
According to Locke's well-known explanation of the justification of
private property:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has
a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour
of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then
he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his
Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by
this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For
this Labour being the unquestionable property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have
a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in
common for others.'39
136. LOCKE, supra note 118, § 26, at 286-87, § 28, at 288-89; WALDRON, supra note 60, at 168.
Actually, Locke is somewhat mysterious about why appropriation must necessarily be exclusive. With
respect to certain objects, like food and clothing, the need for exclusivity is obvious. But for other
resources, like land, exclusivity is less obviously necessary. Clearly no two people may physically occupy
or farm the same piece of land at the same time, but that does not necessarily mean that many shepherds
could not keep their sheep on the same twenty acres or that some number of people may not occupy the
same house. Indeed, all of the examples Locke uses to show that appropriation and cultivation increase
value and human flourishing contrast cultivated and uncultivated land. None of those examples compare
exclusively and collectively cultivated resources. One must engraft onto Locke's theory something
analogous to the "tragedy of the commons" concept in order to complete the case for exclusive
appropriation of objects like land or shelter.
137. Since, according to Locke, God initially gave the Earth's plenty to man in common, however
one conceives of that state, the claim of the individual who seeks to appropriate an object conflicts with
those of other would-be appropriators.
138. A common problem for all natural law property theories was the difficulty injustifying exclusive
appropriation of objects in a way that bound third parties even though the claim was based on unilateral
action. Pufendorf, like Grotius, claimed that such a binding effect was the result of implicit consent of
those in civil society. STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 92-94 (1991).
Locke rejected the idea of consent and argued that it was labor that allowed an individual to claim as her
own objects those that another might want or need, thereby avoiding violating the foundational principle
that one is under a natural obligation not to harm others' ability to preserve themselves. See RUTH W.
GRANT, JOHN LOCKE'S LIBERALISM 67-71, 91 (1987) (explaining Locke's theory of natural rights as
including the right to self-preservation and the duty to respect the rights of one's equals); JAMES TULLY,
A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND His ADVERSARIES 47 (1980); Hughes, "Recoding, "supra
note 23, at 968.
139. LOCKE, supra note 118, § 27, at 287-88 (emphasis omitted). Note that Locke's conception of
the "person" is not strictly corporeal. Rather, a person is more broadly defined according to a continuing
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It is labor, which we own and mix with those resources given to man in
common for his sustenance and flourishing, that allows us to remove an object
from the common into our private ownership. Clearly then, the moral
foundation of Locke's theory of private property depends on scarcity and
rivalrousness; absent scarcity, there is no allocation problem to solve, 140 and
no system of property is necessary.' As Waldron put it:
Scarcity, as philosophers from Hume to Rawls have pointed out, is a presupposition of
all sensible talk about property. If this assumption were ever to fail (as Marx believed
it some day would) then the traditional problem of the nature and justification of rival
types of property systems would probably disappear. 1
42
Since identity is nonrivalrous and therefore not scarce, it need not be
appropriated exclusively, and Lockean property theory offers little moral
support for property rights in identity. 43
consciousness of past and present actions that make up "who you are." "Personality," as Waldron says, "is
constituted by the creative activity of a free and conscious agent." WALDRON, supra note 60, at 179. As
a result, Locke's premise that every person has a property in himself is more than a bare first principle-it
is a logical imperative. Our bodies are not self-evidently our own; they could be owned by the king or
someone who could force our actions. But personality is inseparable from ourselves and cannot be
practically taken from us. Palmer, supra note 101, at 72-73. So defining our "person" makes Locke's
second step, that we own our labor, less obvious. If we own our bodies, then we more clearly own what we
do with them. If our bodies and our person are distinct, however, our labor arguably is more closely related
to our bodies than our person, as defined by Locke. Thus, we are compelled to conclude, if we are to
believe Locke, that our natural capacity to control the actions of our bodies (which is effectively inalienable)
means that we naturally own our bodies as well as our person.
140. For the scarcity condition to be met, the resources must be rivalrous. Nonrivalrous resources
can be used by many without depletion, and thus, even if there are few of those resources, no allocation is
necessary.
141. This is not to say that there might not be other reasons why private property, as a social
institution, would be justified, only that Locke's theory, upon which contemporary labor arguments are (at
least loosely) based, depends on those conditions.
142. WALDRON, supra note 60, at 31-32.
143. Even if the individual's labor gives her a moral right against noncreative copyists whose sole
motivation is commercial, that moral right is subject to Locke's "enough, and as good" proviso. LOCKE,
supra note 118, § 27, at 287-88, § 33, at 291; Gordon, supra note 97, at 1562. That qualification may call
for a greater right to copy than the law currently recognizes. In order to contribute to culture, one needs to
use the tools of that culture. Thus, even if identities are newly created and never before existed, private
control might not leave "enough and as good" for others. Gordon's application of the "enough and as good"
qualification to other forms of intellectual property leads her to the conclusion that the law should allow
copying whenever granting exclusive rights to the creator would put subsequent creators in a worse position
than they would have been if the original creator had never made her contribution. Gordon, supra note 97,
at 1570.
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Despite the seeming inapplicability of Lockean property theory, some
have argued that the argument for property rights in intangible goods is even
stronger than that for physical goods. Supporters of that position make two
points. First, Locke's theory was intended to justify individuals taking
resources out of the common and appropriating them for private use.
Ownership of intangibles, on the other hand, does not require such a
justification because the creator is not physically removing something from
the common stock and thereby making others worse off. Instead, the creator
arguably is adding to the stock of resources.'" Second, the value of intangible
objects is, in a sense, more clearly a result of the labor that was expended to
create them than the value of a physical object that existed prior to
appropriation. In other words, intangible objects are a stronger case because,
while Locke struggles tojustify allocation of the full value of a physical object
to an individual based upon the individual's labor,'45 the case for property
rights in incorporeal property does not depend on controversial assumptions
about relative responsibility for value. Since identity does not exist prior to
being created by someone, it has no pre-existing use value.
But these arguments move too fast. First and foremost, they ignore the
incremental and collective nature of identity (and particularly identity-value)
creation. Second, they are divorced from the premise of Lockean property.
For Locke, the institution of private property fundamentally is about using
scarce resources made available by God. Outside the realm of those
resources, Locke's theory offers no moral argument for any institution of
private property since there is no allocation problem. It would be
disingenuous to ignore such a foundational principle yet claim that ideal
objects that do not share the characteristics that make Locke's system
necessary can nevertheless claim the same moral legitimacy as those things
central to the institution's purpose.
Thus, to whatever extent it would be relevant that creation of intangible
property does not depend on removing pre-existing objects from the world, it
could only be in relation to an instrumental version of the labor theory.'46
144. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 11 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1222
(1998) (noting that the creation of intellectual property is "more plainly and completely the product of the
author's labor").
145. Locke must deal with an objection that a physical object has use value prior to and independent
of the labor added to it and granting the laborer exclusive rights therefore overcompensates her. He answers
this criticism by acknowledging that some portion of use value is not created by an individual, but asserting
that the vast majority (9/10, 99/100, or even 999/1000) of the value is the result of labor. LOCKE, supra
note 118, § 40, at 296, § 43, at 298; WALDRON, supra note 60, at 191.
146. Curiously, in her otherwise thorough application of Lockean labor theory to intellectual property
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Such a theory might recognize that labor plays some role in creating intangible
objects, even if not a dispositive one, and choose to reward creators with
property rights because it is the best way to induce the requisite labor. Under
that theory, the fact that the laborer does not physically remove anything
might bear on the costs of creating the incentive. There are, however, other
objections to such an instrumental theory, which are discussed below.
3. Instrumental Labor Theory Does Not Support a Property Right in
Identity
While Locke's moral philosophy does not itself provide a normative
foundation for ownership of identity, it may nevertheless be necessary to
award property rights in identity in order to encourage socially useful
investment.'47 That supporters of the right of publicity might rely on an
instrumental labor theory should come as no surprise, as that theory is very
often the first line of defense in justifying intellectual property protection. 148
Indeed, an instrumental labor theory is generally regarded as the foundation
of both patent and copyright law.1
49
protection, Wendy Gordon lapses into endorsing an instrumental version of Lockean theory in regard to the
protection of intangibles, even though she insists that Locke's theory was moral. See Gordon, supra note
97, at 1548. She argues that copying intangible property "harm[s] important interests, even if it does not
deprive the creator of physical use of her creation," because it harms the author financially. Id. Her
argument goes only to harm, however, which begs the initial question of entitlement. On Locke's account,
scarcity and rivalry are essential preconditions of the laborer's moral claim to ownership; without those
conditions, there is no moral claim, and the laborer is not "harmed" in any moral sense.
147. Some accounts would place a "deserts" theory somewhere in between Locke's pure moral
justification and the purely utilitarian view. I do not believe "deserts" is really a separate theory because
such theories ultimately lack substance without a reason why an individual "deserves" a reward. See
WALDRON, supra note 60, at 203. With respect to identity appropriation claims, I treat "deserts" as a
species of the instrumental theory because, to the extent supporters speak of individuals "deserving" to own
their identities, the reasons tend to be instrumental: We reward A in order to encourage him and others to
act in a similar way in the future, or we reward A because labor is unpleasant and we nonetheless want to
encourage it to be done because it is both virtuous and utility-enhancing for society as a whole. See
Hughes, supra note 124, at 296.
148. Cf Gordon, supra note 97, at 1540 ("Locke's labor theory of property and allied approaches
have been used so frequently as a justification for creators' ownership rights that Locke's Two Treatises
have been erroneously credited with having developed an explicit defense of intellectual property.")
(footnotes omitted).
149. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (stating that the interest
protected by the right of publicity "is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing
on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting
feelings or reputation"). Interestingly, although the instrumental theory appears to be consistent with other
areas of intellectual property law, even in those areas where the instrumental calculus seems more settled
the law recognizes a greater right to copy through fair use doctrines and other restrictions on the subject
[Vol. 67:225
2005] THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND AUTONOMOUS SELF-DEFINITION 259
The instrumental labor justification could be understood in two possible
ways. First, property rights in identity encourage individuals to work harder
to become successful actors, athletes, or other public citizens. Under that
rationale, the commercial benefits of achieving celebrity status create
incentives for individuals to invest in their native field (e.g., art or sports).
Second, and alternatively, protecting the value of an identity's commercial use
might encourage individuals to invest specifically in developing a persona, an
image to which consumers are attracted. The two types of incentives,
although at some level related, are clearly distinct. It is possible that someone
would work extremely hard to become the world's best golfer, thereby
creating demand to see that individual golf, but still fail to create a public
persona that draws people to purchase products. 5 The inverse is also true:
While many of the most marketable athletes are at the top of their sports, some
commercially marketable people are decidedly not. For example, despite her
lack of athletic success, tennis player Anna Kournikova has been among the
most well-known and marketable female athletes.' 5 ' Evidently it is not
necessarily the same characteristics that lead to success both within one's
native field and within the market for commercial endorsements.
Consequently, a full account of an instrumental labor theory necessitates
analysis of the effect of identity ownership on investment both in the native
fields of right of publicity claimants and in producing valuable personas. In
evaluating the incentives, however, we must focus on the marginal benefit of
matter of protection. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that 2
Live Crew's remake of Roy Orbison's Pretty Woman qualified as fair use despite extensive borrowing);
Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that copyright protection
extends only to works with at least minimal creativity, regardless of how much effort was expended to
create a work).
150. Some of the very best and highest paid players in Sports Illustrated's recent list of the fifty
highest paid athletes earned very little additional income from endorsements, in comparison with their
salaries and the endorsement income of some of their contemporaries. Jonah Freedman, The Fortunate 50,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 17, 2004, at 64-65. Barry Bonds, for example, who is often considered the best
baseball player in the game today (if not ever), earned $15,000,000 in salary compared to $4,000,000 in
endorsement income. Id. at 65. Others were much more extreme, including Manny Ramirez, star outfielder
for the Boston Red Sox and the second highest earning baseball player, who earned $23,700,000 in salary
and only $250,000 in endorsement income. Id. at 64.
151. According to the October 27, 2003, AdAge Special Report on Sports Marketing, Anna
Koumikova has earned between $10 and $15 million annually for endorsing Adidas, Berlie's Multiway
sports bra, and Xbox, among other products. AdAge Special Report on Sports Marketing: PayoffPitches,
ADVERTISING AGE 5-6 (Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/info/press/news/
2003/102703_adagecharts.pdf(last visited May 25, 2005). This marketing success was not the result of
overwhelming on-court success. Id. ("Tennis trophies have eluded the 22-year-old, but endorsement deals
haven't."); see also The Official Site of Anna Kournikova, http://www.koumikova.com/facts/results.php
(listing two tournament wins in 122 tournaments played between 1995 and 2002).
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the right of publicity beyond other existing claims. Even in a world with no
right of publicity at all, individuals have significant power to prevent
commercial uses of their identity. Under current law, any uses that falsely
suggest that the individual endorsed or approved of the company using his or
her image, or that company's product or service, gives rise to an unfair
competition claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act'5 2 and/or state statutory
or common law.'53 The incentives produced by the right of publicity then
relate to those uses of identity that the right of publicity would sanction but
that would otherwise escape liability under unfair competition claims: uses
of an individual's name, likeness, or other aspects of identity that are
commercial in nature but that do not suggest sponsorship or endorsement. 54
Viewed in that light, the right of publicity seems remarkably unnecessary.
With respect to incentives to invest in one's native field, it is highly
questionable whether Michael Jordan worked hard to become a good
basketball player because he wanted to control commercial uses of his image.
Undoubtedly he was happy to have been able to parlay his success into
commercial endorsements, but it seems unlikely that the long hours he spent
practicing his jump shot as a child were driven by the chance to be featured
on a box of Wheaties. To the extent he was motivated by the chance to make
a lot of money, the potential salaries of professional athletes would seem to
provide sufficient incentive to invest in becoming a good basketball player. 55
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
153. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
978 F.2d 1093, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 1992); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARThY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:15 (4th ed. 2004).
154. The court in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc. claimed that "[tihe elements ofa Lanham Act
false endorsement claim are similar to the elements of a right of publicity claim under Ohio law" and even
cited one legal scholar for the proposition that "a Lanham Act false endorsement claim is the federal
equivalent of the right of publicity." ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915,924 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Bruce P. Keller, The Right of Publicity: Past, Present, andFuture, 1207 PLI CORP. LAWANDPRAC.
HANDBOOK 159, 170 (Oct. 2000)). Whether or not the court's citation is accurate, the contention that
§ 43(a) claims are equivalent to right of publicity claims is plainly wrong. In contrast to claims under the
Lanham Act, the right of publicity does not require any proof of a likelihood of confusion. In fact, the
requirement of confusion under the Lanham Act was one of the primary reasons Nimmer called for an
independent right of publicity; he believed that the requirement that claimants prove a likelihood of
confusion to sustain unfair competition claims prevented celebrities from reaching conduct he believed
needed a remedy. See Nimmer, supra note 15, at 212-13.
155. According to Sports Illustrated's recent list of the fifty highest paid athletes in the United States,
only 9 of the 50 made more money from endorsement or appearance fees than they did in salary or
winnings. See Freedman, supra note 150, at 64-65. By contrast, 36 of the 50 made more than twice as
much in salary or earnings as from endorsements or appearance fees, and those 36 averaged 24.8 times as
much from salary and winnings (in some cases 50 to 100 times more). See id. Moreover, for all of these
athletes, the vast majority of what is counted as "endorsement contracts and appearance fees" is money they
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That incentive structure is also not unique to athletes; actors (the other major
constituency of the right of publicity) are similarly well compensated for their
work even apart from commercial endorsements. 5
6
And that is to say nothing of the substantial non-commercial incentives
to invest in one's native skill. Highly successful people in any field tend to
be intensely competitive and strongly desire recognition among the elite in
their particular field.5 7 As one commentator noted in arguing against a
requirement that a celebrity exploit her image during her lifetime in order for
the right to be descendible, "[t]here is little evidence that public figures who
have a particular talent or expertise will fail to exercise it in the absence of a
requirement that they market their image.""' Similarly, there is little evidence
to suggest that public figures with particular talents or expertise will fail to
exercise them absent a property right in their image.'59
Moreover, just as there are sufficient incentives to induce individuals to
invest in their native fields even without legal protection of their images, there
would earn even without any right of publicity. See id. at 65. Much of their endorsement income comes
from wearing certain shoes or apparel, using certain equipment, and/or personally appearing in advertising
for those companies. All of that income would be protected even in a world where their only protection for
use of their image was against uses that suggested endorsement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and/or
common law unfair competition claims.
156. Richard Natale, The Stars Are Making Lots More Than You Think, E!ONLINE (June 9, 2000)
(describing pay structure of fil stars and listing approximate compensation of top grossing stars for
movies in 2000, including 12 actors who earned at least $20 million for movies that year), available at
http://www.eonline.com/Features/Features/Salaries/ (last visited May 25, 2005).
157. For those celebrities whose native fields do not yield the type of financial rewards mentioned
above, such as politicians or activists like Martin Luther King, Jr., the non-economic incentives presumably
are paramount. It is hard to believe that Martin Luther King, Jr., would not have engaged in his important
civil rights advocacy absent a property right in his image. Indeed, we have good empirical evidence that
he was not motivated by the chance to commodify his image since the right of publicity was not yet widely
accepted during his lifetime. In addition, notwithstanding Arnold Schwarzenegger's recent suit, many
politicians and other public citizens seem sufficiently unconcerned with commercial uses of their identities
that most have not complained about bobblehead dolls bearing their images. See O.D.M., Inc. http://www.
bosleybobbers.com (offering bobbleheads in the image of political figures including Tom Daschle; Laura,
Barbara, George H.W. and George W. Bush; Jesse Jackson; John Kerry; Rudy Giuliani; and Hillary Clinton,
not to mention several other political figures who are no longer living). More importantly, even if we
discovered that some people are motivated to become activists or politicians because of the right of
publicity, would we want to encourage those people?
158. Note, An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as a Limit on the Right of
Publicity, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1703, 1714 (1983).
159. Madow makes an interesting point that, considered in all of its manifestations, the "fame"
phenomenon may lead to over-investment in celebrity-producing endeavors (including sports) as many
unrealistically seek the rewards is a potential way out of a life of poverty. See Madow, supra note 11, at
216. That type of over-investment may well be a result of our celebrity culture, but the right of publicity
is probably not significantly to blame for it given the magnitude of the financial rewards available even
without a right of publicity.
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are significant extra-legal incentives to invest specifically in developing a
persona. 160  An actor's visibility and "star power" enhances her ability to
attract customers to the box office, thereby allowing her to command higher
compensation for her appearance in a movie. Indeed, the impact of a
headlining star on a movie's box office revenue is so much a part of
Hollywood's economic model that an actor's compensation is often explicitly
tied to the movie's gross box office receipts, at least for those stars capable of
driving those receipts.16' Likewise, a well-known athlete makes more money
when more fans want to see him play. Tiger Woods's presence on the PGA
Tour has increased viewership and attendance and has driven the value of
tournament purses to record highs.162  As a result, failing to prevent third
parties from using Tiger Woods's image to sell soda, for example, may
prevent Tiger from capturing all of the value of the "Tiger Woods persona,"
but he has an incentive to invest substantially in that persona even absent any
protection against the commercial use of his identity.
63
160. The right of publicity is a relatively new development in the law. Nevertheless, there was no
apparent shortage of great authors, actors or athletes prior to its adoption. Indeed, one would be hard-
pressed to make a compelling argument that the quality of production has significantly improved since
Shakespeare wrote his many plays. Moreover, although the conventional history claims that the right of
publicity did not become necessary until the commercialization of the 1900s, there does not appear to be
a shortage of aspiring stars in modem-day England, which has yet to embrace an analogous claim.
161. Richard Natale's E!O line article describes A-list movie stars' "gross-participation deal [s]," and
states that "the bigger the star, the bigger the cut." Natale, supra note 156, at 1-2. He reports that Tom
Cruise earned fifteen percent of every penny made by JERRY MAGUIRE. Id at 2.
162. See Outside The Lines-Can Golf Manage the Tiger Effect? (Aug. 13, 2000) (noting 127
percent increase in PGA Tour purses since Tiger Woods turned professional), at http://espn.go.com/page2/
tvlistings/show21transcript.html; 1996 PGA Tour Career Money Leaders, at http://www.pgatour.com/
stats/leaders/r/1996/1 10.
[Woods is] not cheap. The going rate has soared to about $2 million in appearance money for
Woods to play overseas. But as rich as Woods has become, he has made everyone around him
wealthy. He was largely responsible for two television contracts that have allowed PGA Tour purses
to triple since he turned pro. Television ratings for golf are at an all-time high. They double
whenever Woods plays.
Five Years of Brilliance: Woods Setting Standards Since Becoming Pro (Aug. 27, 2001), at http://sports
illustrated.cnn.com/gol/news/2001/08/27/woods anniversary_ap/. According to the PGA's official all-time
money lists, as recently as 1996, the last year before Tiger Woods joined the Tour as a professional, the
highest total career winnings was just under $10.5 million. In 2004, Woods topped the list with over $45.1
million in winnings. See 2004 PGA Tour Career MoneyLeaders, at http://www.pgatour.com/stats/leaders/
r/2004/110. That number is even more staggering when one considers that Woods amassed all of his total
winnings between 1997 and 2004, whereas the leader in 1996, Greg Norman, took almost 20 years to reach
his 1996 total, having turned professional in 1976. See Greg Norman-Biographical Information, at http://
www.pgatour.com/players/bio/132080.
163. See Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 144-45 ("[tlhe costs of creating a persona are recaptured through
the activity with which the purveyor is primarily associated. The costs ofcreating the Vanna White persona
were, for example, covered by fees paid by the producers of Wheel of Fortune.").
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More to the point, even assuming, arguendo, that the chance for
commercial endorsements plays some role in encouraging individuals to
develop their native skills or to invest in their personas, the right of publicity
plays virtually no role in creating that incentive. The vast majority of any
such incentive would come from the chance to earn endorsement income, not
from payments for other non-endorsement commercial uses, since
endorsement uses provide the greatest income opportunities."6  Without a
right of publicity, celebrities would retain much of their ability to earn
endorsement income because uses that suggested endorsement would still be
subject to unfair competition claims. Thus, even if the right of publicity was
eliminated, celebrities still could earn money from personally appearing in
advertisements and for making statements about products. They could also
still sell the rights to uses designated as "officially licensed," and they could
wear and/or use the endorsed product. 6 ' Taken together, it is clear that
individuals retain substantial income-earning capacity relative to the
associative value of their identity even in a world with no separate identity
right.'66 To whatever extent potential income encourages investment in one's
skills, or even in one's persona, 167 it is primarily unfair competition claims that
serve as the instrument.
4. Labor Theory Does Not Ground Current Law
Ironically, given its overwhelming support, positive law actually bears
only a loose relationship to the labor-based justification courts and
commentators tend to assert (whether construed as a moral or instrumental
theory). 168  For example, though the right of publicity depends on a
164. Even in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., Judge Frank recognized that
celebrities are primarily concerned with endorsement income, see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
Of course, the fact that they would feel sorely deprived of possible income is not a compelling reason to
give them the right to that income.
165. I address the argument that inability to control non-endorsement commercial uses of identity
would destroy the market for endorsement uses in the context of the allocative efficiency argument for
identity rights. See infra Section ll.D.
166. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 223 (stating that the right of publicity creates minimal
incremental encouragement).
167. As noted above, there are a number of extra-legal incentives to invest in persona, to the extent
effort in developing a persona has to do with the value of that persona. Protection afforded to endorsement
uses enhances those incentives since investments in persona may make the celebrity a more valuable
commercial endorser.
168. That is, of course, when courts bother to identify a theory at all.
In fact, the decisions [regarding the right of publicity] do not tend to include justifications for
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repudiation of privacy in the context of celebrity identity appropriation and is
justified solely by reference to economic value, 169 most versions of the right
of publicity now allow non-celebrities to assert a claim, 7 o notwithstanding the
fact that their identities generally lack economic value. 71  Even if non-
celebrity identities have some economic value, that value is not the result of
labor; private individuals have expended virtually no effort developing a
persona. Moreover, since non-celebrities have not expended effort developing
placing what is, after all, called a public image, within the plenary control of private individuals.
Rather, the courts tend to assume that, if someone hones an image, that person generally has the
right to capture the benefit of all its uses.
Cf Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 127-28. Dreyfuss is right that courts have assumed that individuals should
capture all of the value of their identity, but she glosses over a more fundamental assumption courts
typically make: that the individual creates or "hones" the image. Courts undertake virtually no effort to
determine the extent to which that assumption is valid. But see Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n, 335 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2003) (questioning that assumption).
169. See Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The right of
publicity is designed to reserve to a celebrity the personal right to exploit the commercial value of his own
identity."); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that
the right was meant to protect famous celebrities). A few commentators have recognized that commercial
use of identity does not solely cause economic harm. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, for example, has stated that:
[i]n evaluating the nature of the harm to the plaintiff... economic harms are typically far less
onerous than nonmonetizable harms which derive from uses the plaintiff would never have
condoned. These nonmonetizable, or morally based, harms can include reputational damage,
distasteful associations, or uses which advance a substantive argument the plaintiff finds
objectionable.
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right ofPublicity vs. The First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule
Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 50 (1994). That observation, however, has had very little impact at the theoretical
level, as supporters continue to embrace a labor-based theory of identity. Haemmerli's article, which offers
a Kantian theory of a "unified" right of publicity, is a notable exception. See Haemmerli, supra note 18,
at 386 n.6. This article argues that identity appropriation implicates one's ability to autonomously define
herself, inflicting harms somewhat similar to those Kwall identified. For the reasons discussed below,
however, I do not believe the autonomy interest I describe is derived from Kantian property theory as
Haemmerli argues.
170. As a result, where third parties make unauthorized uses of their identities, private citizens
frequently may pursue both privacy and publicity claims, even though, on the traditional account, the two
claims are incompatible.
171. McCarthy claims that there is no one whose identity lacks commercial value and that the fact
of the defendant's use is itself proof of value. McCARTHY, supra note 153, § 4:17. His argument is
inconsistent with his own description of why celebrities' identities are commercially valuable. Id. § 4:8.
Celebrities, he argues, catch consumers' eyes and give an advertisement a "look at me!" effect. Id. In
addition, buying the product or service with which the celebrity is associated allows a consumer to
vicariously associate with that celebrity. Id. Neither argument applies in the case of non-celebrities; indeed
non-celebrities are largely fungible. Advertisers surely choose one person to use rather than another
because, in some small way, that person better fits the image the advertiser seeks to portray, at least as
compared to the other available options. An advertiser is looking for an "All-American" male, or perhaps
someone who fits the "rebel" image they seek to portray. But they do not seek a particular person because
of that person's unique identity, as the features for which they are looking may not even be unique.
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a persona and are unlikely to do so in the future, publicity rights neither
reward non-celebrities for their labor nor provide them any incentive to invest
in their persona in the future. Despite this disconnection, the majority of
jurisdictions allow private citizens a right of publicity claim,'72 and
commentators regularly evoke the notion of a laboriously constructed image
in defending the claim.173
Additionally, to the extent any versions of the right of publicity do require
that the claimant's identity have economic value,' 74 none of the extant
formulations would require a plaintiff to demonstrate that she has expended
even an ounce of effort cultivating that value. 175 Indeed, the stated law of at
least some jurisdictions allows a celebrity to bring a right of publicity claim
when the "identity" she seeks to protect is entirely fortuitous, and even when
it is at least in part the result of the labor of others. The disjoint with the
supposed theory of the right of publicity was exemplified by the Ninth Circuit
in White:
Television and other media create marketable celebrity identity value. Considerable
energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity value to exploit
it for profit. The law protects the celebrity's sole right to exploit this value whether the
celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination
thereof.76
Notably, the idea that an individual might acquire property rights in an
identity developed through "dumb luck" is directly contrary to Locke's notion
of morally significant labor. Locke did not consider aimless effort labor at all.
To be morally justified in claiming property rights, an individual must have
172. See id. § 4.14 ("But the better view as espoused by the vast majority of commentators and courts
is that everyone has a right of publicity."). Of course, the private individual need not use a right of
publicity since the very same invasion would likely give the private person a right of privacy claim.
173. See, e.g., Preserving Personality, supra note 134, at 162 ("Constructed personas are indeed
original works of authorship. Celebrities themselves laboriously construct their personas, and they enlist
the cooperation of the media and other entities to package and promote their personas as images.") (internal
citations omitted).
174. See Landham, 227 F.3d at 624 ("Landham correctly argues that he need not be a national
celebrity to prevail. But in order to assert the right of publicity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is
value in associating an item of commerce with his identity."); Cheatham v. Paisano Publ'n, Inc., 891 F.
Supp. 381,386-87 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (rejecting plaintiffs right of publicity claim under Kentucky law since
the plaintiff failed to show that his identity had significant "commercial value," even though absolute
celebrity is not required).
175. See, e.g., McCARTHY, supra note 153, § 1.3 ("Today it is possible to state with clarity that the
right of publicity is simply this: it is the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use
of his or her identity.").
176. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
purposely directed her effort to achieve an intended result.' 77  The only
"effort" contemplated by the White court was effort in exploiting the value of
her identity. It was not effort purposely directed at creating the identity-the
value of an identity, the court conceded, largely was the result of other factors.
Thus, according to the court, the fact that a celebrity might work hard to
exploit an identity, the value of which she was entirely without responsibility
for creating, somehow gives her the exclusive right to exploit it. That is a
remarkably unpersuasive reason for assigning property rights-any rational
actor would seek to exploit a valuable asset to which the law had given her the
rights. And the argument fares no better if the right of publicity is regarded
as purely instrumental. A rule that grants property rights without regard to
whether an individual has acted purposively cannot give a celebrity any
incentive; how can the law incentivize "dumb luck"?
Beyond the fact that these developments cannot be explained by Lockean
theory, some aspects of the current right of publicity might actually violate
Lockean principles. As the White court alluded, some right of publicity cases
have allowed a celebrity to control uses of her identity even though the value
of that identity was largely the result of someone else's labor. For example,
courts have routinely protected an actor's right of publicity when the
"identity" in question was intimately intertwined with a character the actor
played (if not simply the character).' In those cases, one might plausibly
argue that the identity the actor sought to protect was solely the result of
another's labor. That result cannot be rationalized by a theory founded on the
moral primacy of an individual's labor. Nor can awarding the rights to
someone not primarily responsible for creating a persona provide incentives
to create personas.
179
177. See LOCKE, supra note 118, § 32, at 290-91
Aimless effort is not labor.... Most important from the perspective of the laborer's claim ... is the
laborer's purposiveness. A stranger's taking of another's labored-on objects is likely to merit legal
intervention only if the taking interferes with a goal or project to which the laborer has purposely
directed her effort.
Gordon, supra note 97, at 1547.
178. See Wendt v. Host Int'l., Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (addressing actors' right of publicity
claims against an airport bar's licensed use ofanimatic robots based on the actors' characters on the Cheers
TV show); McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the plaintiff, the actor who
portrayed "Spanky" character in the Our Gang series, was challenging the use of the "Spanky McFarland"
name for a restaurant and the use of his image as it appeared on the show); White, 971 F.2d at 1395
(describing use of a robot next to a game show board, similar to the position in which Vanna White stands
in her role on Wheel of Fortune).
179. There are, of course, other incentives for those other creators, be they the writers of Cheers or
the creators of Wheel of Fortune. Roberta Kwall is correct when she notes that "[tihose who assist the
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Lockean property theory also provides no support for publicity rights for
those who have not made productive commercial use of their identity.
Nevertheless, most formulations of the right of publicity have done away with
any requirement that an individual have made previous commercial use of her
identity in order to claim a right of publicity. 8 ° Lockean property rights arise
and persist only through productive use. 8' Mere inclosure is not enough to
justify property rights.'82 Thus, one who simply seeks to prevent others from
making use of her identity, without making use herself, has no claim to
Lockean property."'
The instrumental labor theory also offers little support for modem
developments regarding the duration of the right of publicity. For example,
a variety of state statutes contain reach-back provisions that extend the post-
mortem right of publicity for a period of time prior to the enactment of the
statute to cover individuals who died many years before the applicable statute
was passed.'84 Even aside from the question of whether post-mortem rights
ever create any incentives given their likely remoteness in time,'85 rights that
did not exist during an individual's lifetime clearly could not have provided
any incentive whatsoever.
Finally, the prevailing theory of the right of publicity as exclusively
addressing an economic interest relies on the assumption that what is
bothersome to the celebrity about particular uses is not that the uses were
celebrity in creating a marketable image typically are paid handsomely for their time and efforts."
Preserving Personality, supra note 134, at 162. But the same could be said with respect to many of the
efforts made by the celebrities themselves-the effort it takes to create a persona is often incidental to
another endeavor, for which the celebrity is likely to be paid handsomely. Her argument then only
demonstrates that the right of publicity probably provides very little incentive to anyone.
180. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d
674, 683 (11 th Cir. 1983). But cf Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting
implicitly a rule that the plaintiff need not have commercially exploited his image since Waits's complaint
was that he would not have agreed to the use).
181. LOCKE, supra note 118, § 29, at 289.
182. Id.
183. WALDRON, supra note 60, at 20.
184. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1(g) (2005) (reaching back 70 years); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 26.003 (1999) (reaching back 50 years); and WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.040 (2000) (reaching back 10
years to cover individuals whose identities lacked commercial value at the time of death, and 75 years for
those whose identities did have value). Though it does not precisely address the issue, Indiana's statute may
reach back as much as 100 years. IND. CODE § 32-36-1-8(a) (2002) ("A person may not use an aspect of
a personality's right of publicity for a commercial purpose during the personality's lifetime or for one
hundred (100) years after the personality's death without having obtained previous written consent ....").
185. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254-55 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing based on
figures provided in amicus brief filed by group of economists that the 1 percent chance of earning $100 per
year in royalties after 75 years, when discounted to present value, is worth approximately seven cents).
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made, but that she was not paid for the uses. 8 6 But if lack of payment was the
only harm, then a liability rule requiring the defendant to pay for unauthorized
uses, perhaps slightly increased to encourage voluntary exchanges, would be
sufficient. Of course, the current system incorporates a property rule allowing
injunctions against unauthorized uses. 8 7 That reality probably reflects a
recognition that economic interests are not all that is at stake-some
celebrities care quite a bit about which uses are made, precisely because they
want to control their reputation, and courts have been willing to take those
subject concerns into account.' 8 That is perfectly defensible, but it is
inconsistent with the prevailing theory of right of publicity claims.
Of course, the fact that the law does not reflect real reliance on a labor-
based theory need not lead to the conclusion that identity claims are
unsupportable on a labor theory. One might alternatively conclude that the
positive law ought to change to better reflect the theoretical foundation of the
claim.'89 The significant weaknesses of any labor-based theory, however,
should caution us against that route. Indeed, courts' recognition of the
problems with those theories might partly explain the doctrinal divergence.
D. The Inconclusiveness ofAllocative Efficiency Arguments
Some law and economics scholars have offered an alternative argument
for property rights in identity.' 90 Their argument is a variation on the familiar
"tragedy of the commons" justification for private property and assumes that
persona is a scarce resource that, absent property rights, would be destroyed
through overuse. As Landes and Posner have stated: "The motive [to provide
stronger publicity rights] is not to encourage greater investment in becoming
a celebrity (the incremental encouragement would doubtless be minimal), but
186. See, e.g., supra note 113, and accompanying text.
187. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 11:22; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 48
cmt. b (1995).
188. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that plaintiff had never
commercially exploited his identity and did not want to develop a reputation as someone who did).
189. The changes that would be necessary to achieve such congruence, however, are unlikely to be
popular with supporters of the right of publicity. Perhaps their reluctance could be understood as a
recognition that there is some other interest at stake besides the bare economic interest supposed by the
traditional account. In fact, I agree that there is another interest at stake, a personal autonomy interest, but
I suggest that the autonomy interest described below is the only legitimate interest that the law should
protect. As a result, I would not be satisfied with a claim that more closely fit the laborjustification either.
The claim should more closely reflect its legitimate justification based on personal autonomy. See infra
Section 1lI.
190. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22; Grady, supra note 95, at 97, 103-04.
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to prevent the premature exhaustion of the commercial value of the celebrity's
name or likeness."' 9' The analogy to the classic overgrazing argument,
Landes and Posner argue, is close.
Overgrazing causes crowding in the short run, with a resulting reduction in weight gain
[by the animals' grazing], and depletion of the pasture in the long run with similar,
though possibly more drastic, results. Similarly, overexposure of a celebrity may turn
people off in the short run and truncate the period in which his name or likeness retains
commercial value.' 92
Thus, according to supporters of this argument, the law should grant an
individual exclusive rights in her identity so that she can control uses of the
identity and maximize its advertising value.' 93
To date, courts have paid relatively little attention to this allocative
efficiency argument, at least as compared with the labor justification, 94 and
there are good reasons to caution against further acceptance.'95 First, there are
important dissimilarities between identities and physical commodities like
pastures that are subject to "overgrazing." Pastures are rivalrous and
exhaustible; identities are neither. Whereas each grazing of a pasture
physically removes something and threatens to reduce the pasture's utility in
the long run, additional uses of identity neither prevent anyone else's use of
that identity nor use up any of the resource in a physical sense. Thus, identity
is subject to "overgrazing" only in an abstract economic sense.'96
Landes and Posner argue that overgrazing on identity leads to "face
wearout," a reduction in the value of one's persona due to declining interest
191. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 223 (footnote omitted).
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also Grady, supra note 95, at 103-04 (analogizing the right of publicity to fishing
licenses intended to protect against over-fishing). Mark Lemley refers to this theory as an "ex post"
justification of the right of publicity. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 129, 130 (2004).
194. But see Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994). The court stated:
If the appropriation of an individual's goodwill were left untrammeled, it soon would be overused,
as each user will not consider the externality effect his use will have on others. Each use of the
celebrity's name or face will reduce the value that other users can derive from it. The use of a name
or face, therefore, is analogous to the overuse of a public highway: In deciding whether to use the
road, each user does not consider the increased congestion that his use will inflict on others.
Id. at 438 n.2.
195. Some of the problems have been previously noted by other commentators. See Lemley, supra
note 193, at 136-38; Madow, supra note 11, at 220-25.
196. The meaning of an identity is also rivalrous, in a sense, and that form of rivalry provides a much
surer basis on which to confer rights in one's identity. See infra Section 1I. Landes and Posner's argument,
however, focuses exclusively on economic rivalry.
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in the person as her persona is increasingly used. 9 7 Their argument is at odds
with the well-known maxim that "all publicity is good publicity," though both
sentiments are oversimplifications of the phenomenon of fame. Publicity
tends to feed off of itself and, as a result, many uses actually increase the
value of a celebrity's identity, whatever the character of those uses.' 98 But
additional publicity will increase the value of an individual's identity only
until a certain point, after which interest may wane, along with the value of
that identity. In other words, early additional uses may create "network
effects" that increase the value of an identity, but at some point the number of
uses will lead consumers to tire of the identity and it no longer will capture
their attention.'99
In most cases, consumers lose interest in particular cultural objects simply
because something has come along that better defines them at that point in
time.200 The point of tedium, however, may be accelerated, at least in terms
of chronological time, as a result of overexposure. Some celebrities have
more enduring cultural significance than others and, as a result, almost every
aspect of an identity's long-term value will vary from individual to individual:
the rate at which value is added by early uses, the point at which additional
uses begin to erode value and the value of the persona at that point, and the
rate at which the value will decline beyond the wearout point.
These are only generalizations; decentralized control of identity may not
even lead to wearout in all cases. As Landes and Posner concede, certain
cultural symbols have enduring economic value despite a lack of exclusivity,
197. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 223 n.24, 224.
198. Cf Madow, supra note 11, at 222 ("A Madonna T-shirt may be worth more, not less, to
consumers precisely because millions of her fans are already wearing them. The value of the T-shirt may
be greater just because 'everybody's got one."'). Madow's example contrasts the merchandising context
with advertising and suggests that the "everybody's got one" dynamic is more pronounced with respect to
merchandise. Id. at 223-24. 1 have no reason to disagree with that conclusion, except to say that, to some
degree the general point is still applicable to advertising uses.
199. Both of these effects are well-recognized in the cognitive psychology literature, even with respect
to cultural products. See Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing
Materials, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1085 (2003) (describing cultural network effects); Laura R. Bradford,
Parody and Perception: An Alternative Approach to Secondary Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005), at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract id=728604#PaperDownload
(describing consumer research showing that people spend more time on and have greater memory for
advertising messages that use familiar elements in unfamiliar, unexpected ways, but also citing research
demonstrating that, after a certain level of unvaried exposure, tedium sets in and consumers will begin to
feel negatively toward the message or brand).
200. See Hughes, "Recoding, "supra note 23, at 957 ("For all these cultural objects, most Americans
do not seek to recode; they just switch products or pop icons when they will get more utility from
consuming and expressing themselves from other sources.").
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including Santa Claus and many of the fictional characters upon which Disney
has built its considerable empire. 2 1' Fictional characters are not unique in that
respect-several well-known human beings and their works continue to
captivate audiences despite seeming ubiquity. For example, William
Shakespeare and his works remain cultural icons, 212 as does Elvis Presley, of
whom there is a cottage industry of impersonators, notwithstanding
uncertainty over the extent to which his heirs have the right to control uses
that exploit the value of his identity.20 3 Perhaps the number of uses it would
take to reach the wearout point for those objects is so great that, as a practical
matter, it is unlikely ever to be reached. Or perhaps the point was reached, but
the value of those identities decreases in such small amounts with each
successive use that the value remains very high even after many years. In
either case, it can hardly be said that "overgrazing" has destroyed the value of
the identities.
Moreover, the risk of tedium relates primarily to additional uses of an
individual's identity in the same or similar context as the individual exploits
or would exploit her identity commercially. There is an entire other class of
201. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 227. Landes and Posner attribute some of Santa Claus's
enduring significance to its seasonal usage. Id. That explanation may have some resonance with respect
to Santa Claus, but it does not explain the continued use of historical figures like Abraham Lincoln, George
Washington, and Ben Franklin, whose identities are regularly invoked to "hawk mundane commercial
goods," apparently without destroying the value of those identities. See Hughes, "Recoding, " supra note
23, at 961.
202. Landes and Posner argue that the wearout phenomenon is also relevant with respect to works
of authorship, which makes the Shakespeare counter-example even more poignant. See LANDES &POSNER,
supra note 22, at 222.
203. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983) (agreeing with the Sixth
Circuit's conclusion that the right of publicity under Tennessee law is not descendible); Memphis Dev.
Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that the right of publicity under
Tennessee law is not descendible in light of "[t]he intangible and shifting nature of fame and celebrity
status, the presence of widespread public and press participation in its creation, the unusual psychic rewards
and income that often flow from it during life and the fact that it may be created by bad as well as good
conduct..."); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that right ofpublicity
under New Jersey law is descendible and finding that assignees of Elvis Presley's publicity rights
demonstrated likelihood of success on claim against defendant's impersonation of Elvis in stage act). But
see Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (disagreeing with
the Second and Sixth Circuits and holding that right of publicity under Tennessee law is descendible). With
respect to Tennessee law, the issue ofpost-mortem rights of publicity appears to have been settled with the
passage of TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (1984), which established a statutory right of
publicity that is descendible and lasts at least 10 years after death, or if used continuously in commerce, in
perpetuity. There are still some states, however, where identity rights are not descendible because the
available rights cover only living persons. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992); WiS.
STAT. § 895.50 (1996); Heinz v. Frank Lloyd Wright Found., 229 U.S.P.Q. 201, 206 (W.D. Wis. 1986)
(applying Wisconsin statute).
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
uses of celebrity identities that run afoul of the right of publicity but that
obtain their value by standing in contrast to the types of uses the individual
might make-those that recode the identity to fit a different purpose, and very
likely fit in a different commercial niche. Those uses might complicate the
meaning of the original, but they are unlikely to destroy the value of the
individual's identity. Recoders, often parodists in this context, depend on the
salience of their intended targets in order to draw attention to their work.
After all, there are very few parodies of culturally inconsequential people. As
a result, it would be decidedly against their own interests for recoders to
destroy interest in the original interpretation.
Even conceding that dissipation of value is a concern with respect to at
least some identities, however, a right of publicity is not necessarily needed
to prevent the dissipation. Individuals would have significant control over
uses of their identities, through unfair competition claims for example, even
if the right of publicity had never been recognized. For the allocative
efficiency argument to justify a right of publicity claim, one must believe that
third parties would make so many uses of an individual's identity that could
not be remedied by unfair competition or other claims that the identity would
lose its value for endorsements. It is hard to believe that the cases captured
on the margin by the right of publicity would have that effect, particularly
since the right of publicity would leave unaffected uses that are most likely to
lead to overexposure. Under current law, the right of publicity is limited
(ostensibly) to commercial uses of identity, predominantly in connection with
the sale of products or services. It does not offer a remedy against the large
and growing celebrity press industry, including the many magazines and
television shows devoted almost entirely to detailing celebrity lives.2" At the
end of the day, when considered in light of the large variety of ways in which
celebrities are exposed to the public, uses in connection with products and
services seem comparatively harmless.
Additionally, even to the extent that overexposure does lead to wearout,
it is not necessarily clear that the wearout would be "premature." Landes and
Posner seem to mean that the value of an identity declines more quickly (in
terms of chronological time, though probably not in terms of total number of
uses) than it would if exclusive rights were granted to a particular individual.
The Fifth Circuit sated it this way: "[w]ithout the artificial scarcity created
204. An industry ofwhich Hollywood has at least tacitly approved, notwithstanding the fact that such
publications clearly exploit the value of celebrities. Their acceptance may reflect their belief that (most)
all publicity is good publicity.
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by the protection of one's likeness, that likeness would be exploited
commercially until the marginal value of its use is zero."2 °5 That prediction
might turn out to be true-it ultimately is an empirical question-but calling
the process one of "premature exhaustion" is odd; normally we rejoice when
competitive markets lead to production at the marginal cost. As Mark Lemley
noted:
Economists have a term for markets in which different providers keep selling goods with
less and less value until the point is reached where it would cost more to produce a good
than the public is willing to pay for it. We call such a market "perfectly competitive,"
and we have thought for at least three centuries (since Adam Smith) that it is a good
thing.
20 6
Thus, even if we could reliably conclude that, absent a right of publicity,
third parties would overuse an identity and cause face wearout, the only
consequential "loss" would be a private loss to the individual who would
otherwise monopolize control over uses of her identity. Since the cost of
preventing that private loss falls on consumers in the form of higher prices,
absent a compelling incentive-based story, it is not a "loss" with which the law
ordinarily is, or should be, concerned.20 7
The tragedy of the commons metaphor is misplaced for another important
reason. The concern about destroying physical assets is that they are scarce
and nonrenewable. There are a limited number of pastures, for example, and
when one is destroyed, there is a net social loss. Celebrity identities, on the
other hand, are not scarce resources. To the contrary, there appears to be an
endless pool of potential celebrities, or at least a pool so large it is unlikely to
be exhausted as a practical matter. One need only look to the spate of new
reality television shows to see the extent to which people seek fame. The fact
205. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437, 438 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (analogizing use of a name
or face to overuse of a public highway and claiming that individual users fail to consider the externality
effect their use will have on others).
206. Lemley, supra note 193, at 144 (arguing that the analogy of intellectual property to real property
in the tragedy of the commons argument is misplaced).
207. As Mark Lemley correctly noted:
It is true that if we gave only one person control over a particular type of information, that person
would restrict the flow of information, raise its price, and make more money than providers do in
a competitive market. But society as a whole would be worse off, since buyers who could afford
to pay more than what it costs to provide the information still wouldn't receive it.
Id. In other words, exclusive rights holders prevent "exhaustion" by acting like monopolists, complete with
the requisite supracompetitive prices. "But that supracompetitive return is not found money; it comes
directly out of consumer surplus. And basic economics teaches us that what the owner gains from exclusive
control is less than what consumers lose." Id. at 145.
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that many of the participants in those shows are not even paid reflects their
willingness to actively pursue fame solely for fame's sake.208  In such a
society, even if the value of a particular celebrity's image is destroyed through
overuse, there are plenty of potential replacements. In that case, value
dissipation may constitute a loss to that particular celebrity, but there is no real
social loss, and the instinct to preserve the value of the asset is misplaced.2 9
Finally, even if one accepted the premise of the allocative efficiency
argument despite its theoretical shortcomings, the argument does not
necessarily support a celebrity's ownership of her own identity. The theory
offers, at best, a general justification for centralized control of identity. It
offers no guidance whatsoever as to the allocation of that control. Landes and
Posner assume that control should be allocated to the celebrity in order to
maximize advertising value, but there is no reason why any rational individual
who stood to profit from use of identity could not control its use to maximize
return. In fact, taking their economic argument to its logical conclusion would
suggest that the law should allocate ownership to the most efficient manager
of identity. It is not at all clear that this would lead to allocation to the
individual to whom the identity refers.210 Creators are often terrible managers
208. See, e.g., Leonard Pitts, Famous? Notorious? Who Knows The Difference?, THE SUN HERALD
(Miss.), July 2, 2004.
The difference between that era and this one is that then, you usually became famous for something
you did-acting, for instance. But these days, you're just as likely to become famous for something
you "allow," for your willingness to let a TV camera poke, with proctoscopic invasiveness, into the
most intimate regions of your life .... What is apparent is our Pavlovian relationship with the
television camera. You sense this sometimes in watching people outside the "Today" show studio
squeal on cue when the light goes on. Some of us seem to think being seen on TV somehow
validates us, makes us matter more than we otherwise would. It's as if getting on camera were so
important that the "how" of it hardly matters.... Small wonder modem pop culture is shot through
with counterfeit celebrities, nobodies who became somebodies through their sheer, desperate
willingness to open themselves wide.
Id. available at http://www.sunherald.com/mld/thesunherald/news/editorialV9061688.htm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2005).
209. Cf Madow, supra note 11, at 224.
210. For those who think property rights perform important coordination functions, one possible
justification for allocating the right to the individual might be the ease with which he or she could be
identified. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case Against Copyright: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of
Intellectual Property Regimes 83-86 (Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 297; Washington
University School of Law, Working Paper No. 04-10-01, 2004), at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=600802#PaperDownload (describing commercialization theory and coordination
benefits from property rights). That justification relies on two assumptions I question here. First, it is not
clear that ownership needs to be allocated at all; unlike inventions subject to patent protection, there may
not be an important reason for users to coordinate and bring identities to market. Second, there may be
good reason to doubt that the market would correct inefficient allocations made on this basis. Allocation
of rights in identity seems likely to be particularly subject to endowment effects. Daniel Kahneman et al.,
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interested in short-term profit-taking.211 Consequently, absent some reason to
believe that a celebrity will do a betterj ob of maintaining and exploiting value
than some third party would, the allocative efficiency argument probably
better supports Nike's exclusive ownership of Michael Jordan's identity than
Michael Jordan's own self-ownership.1 2
E. The Inapplicability of Kantian Property Theory
Responding to the serious shortcomings of the dominant labor-based
theories, Alice Haemmerli recently advocated an identity appropriation claim
founded on Kantian property theory. Haemmerli's formulation recognizes
that use of another's identity implicates emotional as well as economic
interests, 213 and it opened the door to a thorough re-examination of the claim.
Kantian property theory, however, ultimately does not support an identity
appropriation claim because it cannot convincingly justify a right of exclusion
in the context of identity.
For Kant, the individual must be viewed as an autonomous and moral
being. Freedom is an innate right, the "one sole and original right that belongs
to every human being by virtue of his humanity."2 4 Freedom comprises "the
attribute of a human being's being his own master., 215 In its expression of
positive freedom, the will acts as a self-generated source of moral law, which
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECON. 211
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (describing the problem of endowment effects where rights holders tend to
value the right more when they have it than they would pay to acquire it if they were not allocated the right,
and noting its particular salience when the rights holder believes she is legally entitled to the right).
211. See Lemley, supra note 193, at 147 ("[E]ven if we believed that granting exclusive rights would
yield efficient distribution of information, there is no reason to believe that the subject of the information
is best positioned to manage that distribution. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe otherwise.").
212. It is also worth noting that the allocative efficiency argument, even if taken at face value, offers
little support for recognizing a right for non-celebrities. The theory is about maximizing long-term value
of an identity, yet private citizens do not appear to have any such value to preserve.
213. Haemmerli tentatively suggests that identity appropriation should not have been removed from
the realm of privacy because doing so confused the discussion of the harm of commercial use of identity
and prevented the law from recognizing any subjective component of that harm. See Haemmerli, supra
note 18, at 398-99. I believe that the reason the law came to regard the right of publicity as addressing a
purely economic harm (or at least claiming to do so) is more complex than Haemmerli gives it credit for.
Nevertheless, she rightly notes that the attempts to give theoretical substance to a right based solely on
economic harm have been unsuccessful.
214. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 44 (John Ladd trans., Library of
Liberal Arts 1965) (1791). For an excellent explanation of the Kantian rationale, see Haemmerli, supra note
18.
215. KANT, supra note 214, at 44.
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makes man a moral being and gives him dignity.216 Thus, reason, freedom and
autonomy are inextricable, and Haemmerli argues that interference with one's
person is a direct infringement of the "individual's right to control the use of
her own person, since interference with one's person is a direct infringement
of the innate right of freedom (which takes concrete form in social life as
liberty or freedom from compulsion by others). 217
Property, for Kant, is an outgrowth of this human freedom. Once I
possess... an object, "'anyone who touches it without my consent.., affects
and diminishes that which is internally mine (my freedom).' ... This means
that... property is inseparably associated with one's 'personhood' because
property grows out of freedom and freedom is essential to personhood. ' 21 9
Consequently, all things can be owned and used, and if there were things
outside our power (or our capacity to make use of them), that would conflict
with human freedom because it would deprive freedom of the use of its will
in relation to such things.22' Thus, "it is an a priori assumption of practical
reason that any and every object of my will be viewed and treated as
something that has the objective possibility of being yours or mine., 221 It is
possible to have any and every external object of my will as my property.222
Haemmerli extrapolates from this premise and argues that objectified
personality should be considered just like any other object of one's
will-having the objective possibility of being yours or mine. By virtue of
being the first to arrive at the physical characteristics associated with the
identity, Haemrnmerli argues, the individual to whom those characteristics
belong has priority among claims to the property. Haemmerli asks, "[I]f one's
own image, for example, is treated as an object capable of 'being yours or
216. Haemmerli, supra note 18, at 415; John Ladd, Introduction to KANT, METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS, supra note 214, at xi.
217. Haemmerli, supra note 18, at 416. Like all non-consequentialist philosophy, much of the
soundness of Kant's theory rests on acceptance of his original premise-that the most basic and important
goal is actualization of unfettered autonomy. Kant's entire justification for private property is an outgrowth
of his belief that autonomy is the highest goal of ordered society.
218. I use "possession" conceptually but not literally. I do not mean to imply that the theory requires
physical possession in order to claim ownership. In fact, for Kant, the ability to be secure in one's
ownership without physically having to hold on to property at every moment is an important reason for
individuals to enter into civil society. By "possession" I refer (as Kant does) to the initial stage of
ownership that gives rise to one's rights, where an individual claims an object as her own by expressing her
will upon it.
219. Haemmerli, supra note 18, at 418.
220. KANT, supra note 214, at 52.
221. Id. at 53.
222. Id.
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mine,' why should it not be claimed by the person who is its natural
source?
223
Despite its facial attractiveness, Kantian property theory cannot resolve
ownership of objectified identity. Kant's theory, like Locke's, makes the most
sense in the context of physical objects. Kantian theory is concerned with
uses of an object that interfere with an individual's freedom. With respect to
physical objects, once I have claimed something as my property, any use by
third parties is necessarily harmful. Physical objects are rivalrous; only one
person can possess or use that object at any given time. Where I have claimed
an object as my own, another's use or touching of the object affects my
freedom because it prevents me from using the property according to my will
during the period in which the other person is using the object. Identity, by
contrast, is nonrivalrous, nonexcludable and inexhaustible. An unlimited
number of parties can use any given identity, even at the same time, and no
person's use will physically interfere with another's. Another's use of my
identity does not interfere with my freedom because I can still do what I want
with the same identity, even contemporaneously.
224
Haemmerli recognizes a theoretical possibility of nonrivalrous use, but
suggests that the use would still interfere with one's freedom and that the right
must be exclusive to be meaningful.225 She argues that even if hundreds of
others could all use my intangible property without exhausting it, I would still
be harmed by your use if I made my living from royalties.226 Yet the moral
basis for recognizing property rights, according to Kant, is that without them,
others' use of a particular object would prevent me from using the property
according to my will. If others might simultaneously use the property without
preventing me from using it and without exhausting it, then any "interference"
is purely abstract.227
223. Haemmerli, supra note 18, at 418. Here, Haemmerli's argument falls prey to many of the same
arguments marshaled against the Lockean theory, as it relies on the assumption that the individual is the
"natural source" of identity. Surely the individual is the source of the physical attributes, but it is not clear
that the individual is the source of any semiotic meaning (or economic value) attendant thereto. Much of
that is created by forces external to the individual. Perhaps the individual is the first to lay claim to the
commoditized identity, but perhaps not.
224. To the extent Haemmerli's argument can be interpreted to suggest that the meaning of one's
identity may have rivalrous characteristics (your use of my identity may not prevent me from using it, but
it may prevent me from defining myself precisely as I want), her theory would be similar to the one I
describe below. See infra Section Ill. That theory, however, is only reminiscent ofKantian property theory.
225. Haemmerli, supra note 18, at 419 n.151.
226. Id.
227. Perhaps Kantian theory can be interpreted to call for property rights in situations where the only
interference is that the individual loses the right to use the property as only she wants (irrespective of
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Haemmerli claims that third-party use of an identity might negatively
impact the economic value of that identity as a result of overuse. In that sense,
an individual cannot truly exercise her will freely because, although she is free
to use her identity herself, she may be unable to sell the right to use her
identity as she had hoped. The economic interference theory appears to
suggest perpetual rights in the first user of any economic asset with rivalrous
economic value. This concern for potential royalties resembles Landes and
Posner's economic efficiency argument and can be criticized for many of the
same reasons as that theory.2 28 In particular, to the extent interference with the
use of one's identity is a consequence of rivalrous commercial value, any such
interference would largely be avoided by a rule that prevented only uses that
suggested sponsorship or endorsement, since those are the uses from which
most of the commercial value derives.229 It is not clear then that Kantian
property theory calls for a separate right of publicity.
Moreover, like the allocative efficiency argument, this reading ofKantian
theory does not clearly suggest ownership by the individual to whom an
identity refers. Kant's theory is one of first possession, constrained by use of
an object, which is the way the will expresses itself.230 The first person to
express her will on an object is deemed to have taken possession of the object,
even if she has not picked it up.23' Haemmerli relies on her contention that an
individual is the natural source of a commercial identity as a possible marker
of an expression of will. Yet for Kant's theory of property to tell us anything
about ownership of identity, commercial identity must be conceptualized as
something external to and distinct from the person-as an object with which
individuals can interact.232 If identity can be so conceived, then being the
source of an identity's physical attributes tells us little because initial
formation of Kantian property rights requires use.233 It is use of an object that
marks it off as someone's property and reflects that person's continuing
whether it harms the person in any more concrete way). Even if that is a fair interpretation, I question
whether it is a theory on which we should rely. Recognizing property rights has costs-it restricts the
autonomy of others and should only be done when there is a relatively compelling reason. That third-party
use would interfere with one's subjective desire does not strike me as sufficiently compelling.
228. See supra Section II.D.
229. See supra Section 1l.C.3.
230. KANT, supra note 214, at 57.
231. Id.
232. Property rights, for Kant, are fundamentally about an individual's interaction with objects
external to herself. Id.
233. Recall also that the current right ofpublicity is not limited to aspects of an individual's identity
for which the individual is the natural source. Haemmerli's theory would seem to exclude uses of features
created by writers or others.
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expression of her will on an object. Thus, according to a true Kantian theory,
individuals would have no claim where they have no intention of making
commercial use of their identity.234 The theory might conceivably support
divesting an individual who ceased using her identity of ownership, as she
may have ceased to express her will on it.23
5
Nevertheless, although Kantian property theory is itself an insufficient
justification for the ownership of identity, Haemmerli's analysis offers an
opportunity to re-examine the harm of identity appropriation with a renewed
emphasis on individual autonomy and the emotional harms caused by the
commercial use of one's identity. The following section builds on a variation
of that notion of autonomy and offers a new framework for identity
appropriation.
LI. IDENTITY APPROPRIATION AND A RIGHT OF AUTONOMOUS
SELF-DEFINITION
All of the efforts to date to justify an independent right of publicity have
assumed that identity appropriation claims for private citizens are a species of
privacy claims aimed at protecting the individual's "right to be let alone."
Yet, as we have seen, claims by private citizens were folded too uncritically
into the privacy rubric. Although unauthorized commercial use of a private
citizen's identity, like publication of private facts, threatens the private
citizen's anonymity,216 it also implicates a very different interest in
autonomous self-definition. Specifically, because an individual bears
uniquely any costs attendant to the meaning of her identity, she has an
important interest in controlling uses of her identity that affect her ability to
author that meaning. Notably, the interest in autonomous self-definition is
equally relevant for celebrities, 237 even if they do not share private citizens'
234. Such a rule would preclude recovery by plaintiffs like Tom Waits, who was awarded over $2
million in damages for his right of publicity claim in large part because Waits had a policy of not doing any
commercials, which he believed diminished singers' artistic integrity. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d
1093, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1992).
235. Lockean property theory would support that result as well, as Locke requires productive use of
property. LOCKE, supra note 118, § 29, at 289.
236. Commercial use of identity may also implicate the "solitude" component of privacy Gavison
identified, through probably not "secrecy." Gavision, supra note 55, at 428-29. The secrecy sought by
Warren and Brandeis was secrecy offacts about an individual's life, particularly facts that were potentially
embarrassing. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12. That concern is generally not implicated
by most commercial uses.
237. Because of this additional aspect of harm, commentators were on the right track when they
implied that appropriation might be better thought of as a separate claim from privacy claims.
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interest in anonymity. 238 Thus, while it makes some sense to conceptualize a
right to prevent unauthorized uses of one's identity as "independent" of the
right to privacy, a better distinction would have been between all identity
appropriation claims, whether by celebrities or private citizens, on the one
hand, and traditional privacy claims on the other hand. Although there would
be some overlap between the private citizens' identity appropriation claims
and privacy claims, there is greater theoretical overlap between identity
appropriation claims by private citizens and those by celebrities.
A. The Interest in Self-Definition
Joe, an 82-year-old man, recently was sitting on his couch enjoying a
baseball game with his wife of 55 years. He started to get up to go to the
kitchen between innings when he was stopped in his tracks. Joe watched in
stunned silence as the network broadcast an advertisement for a new drug used
to treat erectile dysfunction. The ad showed an older couple walking through
the park, hand in hand, while a narrator talked of the couple's recently
rediscovered romantic life. Much to Joe's surprise, the couple depicted in the
advertisement was he and his wife.239 Joe was shocked, and quite angry, to
see his picture in the advertisement, but not for the reasons the conventional
accounts of the rights of privacy and publicity predict. Joe was not concerned
because the advertisement made him known or recognizable, nor was he
particularly upset about the fact that the couple's images were being used
commercially. Indeed, he would have had no problem with being depicted in
an advertisement for Dell computers. Joe was upset because his picture was
being used in a commercial for a drug used to treat impotence. In Joe's mind,
use of his picture in the ad suggested that he suffered from erectile
dysfunction and needed the drug. He was, deeply embarrassed by the
suggestion.
Joe's reaction to the advertisement probably resonates with many of us
because we recognize what the dominant theories of privacy and publicity
have long failed to grasp: the devil is in the details. Joe was upset because he
believed his presence in the drug advertisement offered information about
him. He recognized the choices we make-what shoes to wear, what music
238. This is not to concede that celebrities have no interest in secrecy or solitude, the other
components of privacy Gavison identified. Gavison, supra note 55, at 428. Those interests, however, are
not typically implicated by the types of commercial uses with which the right of publicity is concerned.
239. This example is based on a true story, told to me by one of my colleagues about his grandparents.
I am withholding any identifying information to avoid contributing to Joe's outrage.
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to listen to, what companies to associate with-reveal information about us
and our values. As Albus Dumbledore, Headmaster of the Hogwarts School,
explained to a young Harry Potter, "[i]t is our choices... that show what we
truly are, far more than our abilities."24 While some decisions say more than
others, the choices we make with respect to the cultural objects and images we
incorporate into our lives play an important role in reflecting our personalities.
Those objects "represent how their utilizers see themselves (or wish to have
themselves seen) politically and culturally."24' As Justin Hughes noted,
"[p]eople achieve recognition of their individual personalities wearing a
designer label, ordering a particular dish, driving a well-known automobile,
or... reading a particular book." '242
Because we appreciate the significance of others' choices as indicators
of their values, we use the information we glean from someone's choices. Just
as we can glean information about an individual's concern for the environment
from her car choice, we can draw conclusions from one's decision only to buy
clothes "made in America." Likewise for those who commercialize their
identities, choices with respect to the companies with which they associate
reveal information about their values. One can assume from Reba McEntire's
appearance in a Whirlpool commercial that details her and the company's
involvement with Habitat for Humanity that she supports Habitat's mission.243
Similarly, when John Elway appeared in advertisements for Coors beer, one
reasonably could conclude that, at the very least, he does not find alcohol
morally objectionable. 2" When Tiger Woods endorses Nike, many will
conclude that he is unconcerned about the company's child labor practices.24
240. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTrER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS 333 (1999).
241. Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 124. Dreyfuss argues that this reliance on cultural images suggests
that celebrities should have less control over their identities so that others can make use of those identities.
But as Justin Hughes points out, many non-owners merely want to incorporate the images rather than
recoding them. See Hughes, "Recoding, " supra note 23, at 957 ("Focusing on a few people who want to
conscientiously want to redefine cultural objects overlooks this vast majority-people who want the images
to redefine them."). There is substantial room for individuals to incorporate celebrity images for their own
private use even with a robust right of publicity.
242. Hughes, "Recoding, " supra note 23, at 956 (internal citations omitted).
243. "Whirlpool Home Appliances and Reba Deepen Commitment to Habitat for Humanity with
2005 Tour," at http://www.reba.com/rebanews/newsarticle.asp?idnewsarticle=453 (Feb. 28, 2005).
244. The National Football League was concerned about a potential association with alcohol and
therefore adopted a rule that prohibits active players from endorsing alcoholic beverages. See Elway 's Ads
for Coors Violate NFL Rules, at www.sportslawnews.com/archive/articles%201999/CoorsElway.htm
(Sept. 20, 1999).
245. Steve Boggan, "We Blew It": Nike Admits to Mistakes Over Child Labor, COMMON DREAMS
NEWS CTR. (admitting having employed children to manufacture products in Asia, although claiming such
uses were accidental and suggesting that they may be extremely difficult to prevent), available at
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Importantly, the message relayed by a particular choice is only one data
point in the overall image, the full content of which includes not only the
symbols an individual incorporates, but also those which she excludes. Tom
Waits, for example, refused to commodify his identity because he believed
that commercialization undermined an artist's integrity.246 Chris Webber
walked away from an endorsement deal with Nike in part because he did not
want to be associated with a company whose products were too expensive for
underprivileged children to afford.247 After years of serving as the
spokesperson for Dairy Queen, Casey Kasem decided not to continue in that
capacity after he became a vegetarian, and many celebrities have refused to do
cigarette advertisements.248 All of these people understood that avoiding
particular associations was important to the integrity of their identities.
If the overall picture of an individual's character is made up of the
messages conveyed by her associational decisions, then unauthorized use of
her identity interferes with her autonomy because the third party takes at least
partial control over the meaning associated with her. The individual, of
course, will uniquely bear any costs attendant to the altered meaning of her
identity. Thus, while Madow worries that the right of publicity gives
Madonna "veto power" over uses that do not match her preferred meaning,249
it is precisely the risk that others would create a different meaning (but not
share the costs of that meaning) that I suggest ought to give her a claim.
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines0l/1020-01 .htm (Oct. 20,2001); Tim Connor, Still Waiting For
Nike To Do It: Nike's Labor Practices in the Three Years Since CEO Phil Knight's Speech to the National
Press Club, GLOBAL EXCH. (detailing allegations of labor abuses by Nike and Nike Chairman's previous
responses), available at http.//www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/sweatshops/nike/stillwaiting.html (May
2001).
246. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1992). Bette Midler and Dustin
Hoffman also apparently refuse to do commercials. See Charles-Edward Anderson, Soundalike Suit, A.B.A.
J., Jan. 1990, at 24; Howard Kurtz, Dustin Hoffman Wins Suit, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1999, at C2.
247.
But Webber has other, self-imposed pressures on him, to be a good role model for children growing
up in Washington, to be a positive influence in the community. For that reason, Webber took the
unusual step of refusing to renew his shoe contract with Nike. For one thing, it was virtually
impossible for most inner-city kids to afford the Chris Webber model, which sold for $140. "Also,
a lot of my friends own stores in the Detroit area, and Nike doesn't sell to black vendors in the inner
city," Webber said. "You won't find Nikes being sold to small vendors-which mostly happen to
be minorities, whether they be black or Arabic. A lot of pressure was put on me by my friends and
I took upon myself to step up and show them that I mean what I say."
David Ginsburg, Webber Trying to Make a Difference, SOUTH COAST TODAY, available at http://www.s-
t.com/daily/12-96/12-02-96/c06sp204.htm (last visited June 30, 2004).
248. See Hughes, "Recoding, " supra note 23, at 953 (citing interviews with Casey Kasem and
Nicholas Coster, a soap opera actor).
249. See Madow, supra note 11, at 195 n.334.
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Focusing on the importance of control and the potential effect of
particular uses, as opposed to the more general question of whether an image
will be objectified at all, reveals the deep flaw inherent in the notion of an
"independent" right of publicity. Claims that "[t]here is sharp internal
contradiction in the position of a plaintiff who alienates and objectifies her
image and simultaneously claims that it is integral to her very identity in the
manner presupposed by the tort of appropriation '  are based on a failure to
appreciate the full range of potential harms caused by commercial use of
identity. The celebrity's complaint is not that objectification of her image is
itself harmful, but rather that she has lost control over which uses are made. 25'
This autonomy-based rationale over one's identity does not depend on an
individual's responsibility for the value of her identity; she will bear the costs
of her identity even if she has not labored to create it and is utterly without
any responsibility for any of its value.252 Nor does this rationale depend on
whether the identity an individual seeks to project is entirely unique, or
whether it is even a reflection of her "true" character. 253 Even if it is not, she
will have to live with that meaning and with what it says about her, and she
will bear the costs of that meaning.
Recognition of this interest in autonomous self-definition may seem to be
a drastic re-conceptualization of the right of publicity, but courts recognized
this interest early on. In Pavesich, the court noted that the plaintiff's
sensibilities might be shocked if he saw "his picture displayed in places where
he would never go to be gazed upon, at times when and under circumstances
250. Post, supra note 35, at 677.
251. Haemrnmerli exposed the important difference when she asked, rhetorically, "[d]oes the fact that
a prostitute has commodified her body mean that she can be raped with impunity, or that the rape should
be viewed solely in terms of economic impact?" Haenmerli, supra note 18, at 404.
252. The individual's role in creating meaning can be disentangled conceptually from her role in
creating value. I have argued above that value is a market phenomenon for which the individual is, at best,
only partly responsible. I depart from the post-modernists, however, on the question of an individual's role
in creating meaning. Though I acknowledge that certain groups might "recode" images to suit their needs,
I think Madow and others point to relatively rare examples in an attempt to disprove the rule. The meaning
of Madonna is predominantly the result of the choices Madonna has made, many and varied as they have
been. She has plenty of incentives to invest in that meaning even without an identity appropriation claim,
and she certainly borrows from existing images to do so, but her efforts to define herself may be less
effective if she is forced to compete with alternative meanings.
253. Thus, the right I propose should not depend on whether one conceptualizes identity according
to the modern or post-modem view-whether the public image is truly a window to the individual's "real"
personality or is a disconnected entity with its own self-contained meaning. For a different view, see Jeffrey
Malkan, Stolen Photographs, Personality, Publicity, and Privacy, 75 TEX. L. REV. 779, 783, 794 (1997)
(arguing that the rights of privacy and publicity can be understood as proceeding from two different
understandings of personality--the former based on a modern view, and the latter on the postmodern view).
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where if he were personally present the sensibilities of his nature would be
severely shocked." '254 Presumably Pavesich avoided the types of uses about
which he was complaining because of his concern about what those uses said
about him. When Pavesich saw his picture displayed "in places where he
would never go to be gazed upon," he realized that he had lost control over the
text presented to others, as the advertiser was able to put words in his
mouth.255
In fact, closer examination reveals that the harms suffered by the private
plaintiff in Pavesich and the public plaintiff in O'Brien were quite similar.
While Pavesich was made to appear as though he was speaking on behalf of
an insurance company, O'Brien was concerned that use of his image on a beer
promotion suggested his acceptance of beer. Even if such an association
might have been acceptable to the majority of people,256 it was contrary to the
point of view O'Brien had publicly expressed; he had taken a stance against
consumption of alcohol and feared that the use of his photograph in
association with beer products would undermine his public legitimacy on that
issue.
Had the court focused on O'Brien' s autonomy interest in defining his own
values, the determinative issue would not have been whether O'Brien's
feelings were hurt by publicity in general, but whether his loss of control over
the particular contexts in which his identity would be used might create
associations between him and products or services with which he might not
choose to associate. Likewise, the court's naive belief that O'Brien's picture
in a beer calendar did not in any way reflect on him undoubtedly influenced
its belief that the use did not suggest sponsorship or approval. Perhaps the use
254. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905).
The knowledge that one's features and form are being used for such a purpose, and displayed in
such places as such advertisements are often liable to be found, brings not only the person of an
extremely sensitive nature, but even the individual ofordinary sensibility, to a realization that liberty
has been taken away from him; and, as long as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he cannot
be otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the time being under the control of another, that
he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave, without hope of freedom, held to service by a
merciless master; and if a man of true instincts, or even of ordinary sensibilities, no one can be more
conscious of his enthrallment than he is.
Id.
255. See id.
256. The court went out of its way to cite the lower court's finding that
the business of making and selling beer is a legitimate and eminently respectable business and
people of all walks and views in life, without injury to or reflection upon themselves, drink it, and
that any association of O'Brien's picture with a glass of beer could not possibly disgrace or reflect
upon or cause him damage.
O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1941).
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did not indicate O'Brien's endorsement of Pabst beer in particular, but the use
could have suggested, at least to some, acceptance of beer. It clearly
suggested as much to O'Brien. Viewed in that light, O'Brien's complaint was
very similar to Pavesich's.
Though courts and commentators failed to recognize and articulate this
interest in autonomous self-definition as they developed the "independent"
right of publicity, latent appreciation of that interest may explain why some
courts have been concerned about uses of the identities of individuals who
have not made commercial use of their identities. It might also explain why
the courts have been uncomfortable denying relief to individuals whose
identities have no commercial value even though preservation of value is the
stated purpose of the right of publicity." 7
B. Violations of the Right ofAutonomous Self-Definition
Since all individuals share the interest in autonomous self-definition,
every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that interfere
with her ability to define her own public character. This interest is implicated
primarily when another's use suggests an individual's sponsorship or
endorsement, for those uses are most likely to impact third-parties'
perceptions. But even uses that do not suggest endorsement may disrupt the
message an individual seeks to portray by competing with meaning the
individual has tried to project.' 8 Claims by private citizens might go even
further because non-celebrities have a broader range of interests at stake.
257. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall argues that moral rights provisions should be construed to grant
protection for constructed personas and cites Waits v. Frito-Lay to support her claim that "many decisions
actually are more concerned with redressing rights of integrity over the images of the celebrity." Preserving
Personality, supra note 134, at 158. I disagree with Kwall that a persona should be considered a "writing"
subject to copyright protection. In addition, while Kwall is right that courts have at times shown some
concern for celebrities' rights to control the integrity of their image, they have done so much less frequently
than she implies, and often to the ridicule of commentators who suggested that those courts confused the
rights of publicity and privacy. In fact, though the moral rights concept of integrity is a useful analogy to
the type of right for which I argue above, recognition of the right of integrity is quite at odds with the
conventional justification of the right of publicity, which has always attempted to distance itself from any
type of emotional or moral component. For that reason, I cannot agree that the right of publicity, like moral
rights, "seek[s] to protect the integrity of texts by rejecting fluidity of interpretation by the public in favor
of the author's interpretation." Id. The law should prevent re-creation of identity by the public, though not
necessarily fluidity ofinterpretationper se, as long as the individual is the source of that fluidity. Madonna
should be free to reinvent herself as many times as she wishes.
258. Because autonomous self-definition is not adequately protected by a claim limited to uses that
suggest endorsement, I disagree with commentators who argue that trademark law is sufficient to protect
celebrities' legitimate interests.
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Specifically, identity appropriation claims by private citizens can also
encompass uses that violate anonymity, secrecy, or solitude. This part
attempts to sketch out the rough parameters of an identity appropriation claim
aimed at protecting celebrities' and non-celebrities' respective interests in the
right of autonomous self-definition. 9
1. Implied Endorsement
First, an individual should be able to prevent uses that suggest her
sponsorship or endorsement. Such uses are akin to compelled speech,26° a
problem that is well-recognized in the First Amendment context.26'
Compelling a person to express a message herself presents a particular sort of threat to
her freedom of belief: It threatens her ability to control what she tells the world about
who she is and what she holds important forms of expression that can trigger the First
Amendment because they are essential to realizing certain deeply held beliefs.1
62
While freedom of belief is most directly impinged when one is forced to
actually do the expressive act herself, a closely analogous interest is violated
when someone else does the expressive act, and yet the individual appears to
have endorsed that expression. Evidence from modem cognitive psychology
helps explain why; it teaches that users process information differently
259. I am concerned here with rights in aprimafacie sense, but I would endorse a significant First
Amendment defense. There are serious First Amendment interests at stake in many right of publicity cases,
though those interests are probably not as significant in the context of uses of private citizens' identities.
Non-celebrity identity appropriation claims are unlikely seriously to interfere with cultural dialogue
because, unlike their celebrity counterparts, non-celebrity identities do not typically carry any "rich set of
cultural connotations."
260. Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 127 (referring to right of publicity as an adjunct to the First
Amendment, giving individuals the right not to speak); Hughes, "Recoding, " supra note 23, at 929
("Copyright and the right of publicity should protect such a 'freedom not to speak publicly' for causes and
groups in which one does not believe.").
261. Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization,
38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1087, 1120-22 (2005) (identifying as the basis for the Supreme Court's growing
concern about compelled speech a concern that a person will be associated with message she is required
to carry); see also Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) ("PruneYard...
does not undercut the proposition that forced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[S]peech interests
are affected when listeners are likely to identify opinions expressed by members of the public on
commercial property as the views of the owners.").
262. Klass, supra note 261, at 1116.
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depending on source and may be able to contextualize reworkings of
expressive texts if they have sufficient information about source.263
So understood, the interest in autonomous self-definition is quite similar
to the interest Kant believed was implicated by the counterfeiting of books.2"
For Kant, a book, while clearly a corporeal product, also serves as an address
from the author to the reader.26 A pirate then, by printing the author's words,
"speaks on behalf' of the author, though he was not authorized to do so.266
The author, who bears the consequences of her words, is harmed because she
has lost the right to determine when and how those words will be
communicated. In the same way, unauthorized commercial uses of an
individual's identity that suggest the individual's endorsement effectively
"speak on behalf' of the individual, reflecting her values, though the user was
not authorized to do SO. 26 7
The harm of having been forced to "speak on behalf' of something or
someone else may not materialize immediately, yet the risk remains that
compelled association will ultimately prove costly. Perhaps being associated
with Enron would have been acceptable to most people in the mid- 1990s, but
those who had become associated with that company may have regretted that
association in later years. Individuals who voluntarily associated themselves
with Enron, however, were able to weigh the risks of their association.
Someone whose identity was used without their consent and in a way that
suggested endorsement, on the other hand, became associated with the
company without any opportunity to evaluate the risks.2 68 Because of this
long-term risk, and because the right should preserve an individual's right to
263. Bradford, supra note 199, at 49-50.
264. See IMMANUEL KANT, Of The Injustice of Counterfeiting Books, in 1 IMMANUEL KANT, ESSAYS
AND TREATIES (Thoemmes Press 1993); Palmer, supra note 101, at 60.
265. KANT, supra note 214, at 229. That Kant felt the need to articulate this argument against
counterfeiting is further evidence that intangible works were not the type of objects to which he directed
his property theory.
266. Id.
267. This conception also bears some similarity to Margaret Jane Radin's notion of property for
personhood--the idea that ownership of certain types of property is necessary to proper moral development,
and that the law can and should recognize the importance of those forms of property. See Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
268. The First Amendment analogy is not a perfect one since the First Amendment obviously provides
protection against governmental compulsion, which is not implicated by commercial use of identity. Yet
the free speech interest also reflects a social and cultural interest rooted in notions of autonomy. As the
Supreme Court stated in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies
the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal." 512
U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (emphasis added).
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express her personality, individuals should have an absolute right to prevent
uses that suggest her sponsorship or endorsement, without regard to whether
the perceived endorsement would be objectionable to anyone else.
This right should also be somewhat broader than § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act would protect. Lanham Act claims focus on whether the use at issue
suggests sponsorship or endorsement of a particular producer or its products
or services. While uses that suggested that narrow form of endorsement
should be deemed to violate the identity appropriation right, so should uses
that suggested broader endorsement of a type of product or service. Thus,
whether or not John Elway appears to endorse Coors is only one relevant
question; we should also ask whether he appears to endorse beer.
2. Destabilization of Meaning
Other uses that do not suggest an individual's endorsement nevertheless
can interfere with autonomous self-definition by destabilizing the meaning of
cultural identity. This destabilization might result from third-party uses that
offer inconsistent or negative interpretations of an identity. Imagine, for
example, that someone named John Rogers opened an adult entertainment
establishment under the name "Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood," an obvious play
on the famous children's television show that starred Fred Rogers.269 Few
would believe that Fred Rogers endorsed the particular establishment or even
the type of entertainment. That use, however, would undoubtedly create new
associations with the name Mr. Rogers that would come to mind for those who
have encountered both types of uses. "Indeed it is hard to believe that anyone
who had [encountered the strip club] could ever thereafter disassociate it from
[Fred Rogers] .,27o
Research in the area of consumer psychology suggests that when a
cultural product is associated with incompatible values or unpleasant images,
consumers form negative perceptions of the original that are likely to persist
for some time even in the face of attempts by the owner to provide countering
information.27' Not surprisingly, the risk of negative perception is higher
when the consumer of the inconsistent message attributes the message to the
269. I am assuming in this example that the claim arose while Fred Rogers was still living, setting
aside the question of whether his heirs should have a claim based on such uses after his death.
270. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,205 (2d Cir. 1979).
271. See Bradford, supra note 199, at 34 (citing JOHN O'SHAUGHNESSY & NICHOLAS JACKSON
O'SHAUGHNESSY, PERSUASION IN ADVERTISING 59-60, 63 (2004) and Jennifer Aaker et al., When Good
Brands Do Bad, 31 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 1 (2004)).
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source of the image, yet these "source effects" may not be sufficient to prevent
consumers from developing negative perceptions even when they do not
attribute the incompatible message to the owner.272 Negative associations are
particularly unlikely to be overridden when there is frequent exposure to the
inconsistent interpretations.273 The individual whose identity is used in such
a way is positioned to bear the economic and non-economic consequences of
those negative perceptions.274
This "destabilization of meaning" branch of the proposed identity
appropriation claim has an obvious corollary in the concept of dilution in
trademark law, particularly the tarnishment variety.27' The principal focus of
a tarnishment inquiry is on whether the defendant's use creates negative or
unwholesome associations with the plaintiff's mark.276 Some courts, however,
have found tarnishment where the defendant's use, though not inherently
272. See id. at 49-50 (collecting sources discussing "source effects").
273. Id. at 50-51 ("In this way, frequent exposure may override the efficacy of other informational
cues such as source and so confuse consumers as to authorized and illicit interpretations.").
274. Justin Hughes has argued that the audience has important interests in stable meaning as well,
suggesting that "there is good reason to think that the utility derived by passive non-owners from the
stability ofpropertized cultural objects is greater than the utility that would accrue to non-owners who want
to recode cultural objects so much that those non-owners need to be freed from existing legal constraints."
Hughes, "Recoding, " supra note 23, at 928. Indeed, Hughes argues that recoders themselves are sometimes
benefited by restrictions on recoding. "Even [when a non-owner wants to express herself through recoding
a cultural object], the non-owner usually needs a stable, well-known meaning from which her own meaning
will arise and against which it will reverberate." Id. at 941-42. My treatment differs from Hughes's in that
it focuses squarely on the autonomy of the individual to whom an identity refers. If, as Hughes suggests,
we are to focus on overall audience interests, and if we were able to determine that the number of recoders
who depend on reasonably stable meaning was significant, then there would be reason to doubt the need
for law to impose restrictions. In those situations, recoders are unlikely to create works that substantially
affect the predominant meanings of cultural works. I would not treat the issue so broadly. Even if relatively
few recoders will affect meaning, we should target those particular uses because of the cost they will impose
on the individual. For the same reason, I would not elevate audience interests in stability over the
individual's interest in recoding her own identity, which Hughes recognizes as a potential result of focusing
on audience interests. See id. at 987-1009 (rejecting audience "reliance interests" on the ground that they
would not work well).
275. See MCCARTHY, supra note 153, § 24:67 ("A weakening or reduction in the ability of a mark
to clearly and unmistakably distinguish one source can occur in two different dimensions: 'blurring' and
'tamishment."'); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1995) (discussing blurring
and tamishment varieties of dilution).
276. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The sine qua
non of tamishment is a finding that plaintiffs mark will suffer negative associations through defendant's
use."); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1 st Cir. 1987) ("The threat oftarnishment
arises when the goodwill and reputation of a plaintiff's trademark is linked to products which are of a
shoddy quality or which conjure associations that clash with the associations generated by the owner's
lawful use of the mark.").
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unwholesome, is inconsistent with the plaintiff's image. 7 Unlike trademark
owners, individuals' interests in maintaining the integrity of their identity are
not entirely economic. Nevertheless, the research in cognitive psychology
offers support for extending an identity appropriation claim to cover
destabilization of the meaning of their identities through a process akin to
tarnishment. If used widely enough and in ways that are inconsistent with an
individual's proposed meaning, the meaning of an identity can be obscured.
That destabilization can occur even if not all the uses suggest sponsorship or
endorsement, and even if the unauthorized uses are not inherently negative.27
C. The Nature of the Damages
It is important to note that while the autonomy interest implicated by
commercial use of one's identity is shared by all, the damages that flow from
those violations may vary widely. For some individuals, there will be
economic damages. Advertisers seek endorsers who reflect the brand image
they seek to create. Some individuals may not be able to effectively endorse
family-oriented businesses like Disney if their perceived values diverge from
those Disney seeks to portray. Use of a particular individual's identity in
connection with less wholesome products such as tobacco or alcohol,
therefore, could limit the range of her potential endorsements. Those
economic damages are likely limited to celebrities, since non-celebrities rarely
earn money from endorsements. It does not follow, however, that celebrities
suffer only economic harm from appropriation of their identities. Every
individual bears non-economic costs of having their values represented by
others.2 79  Non-economic costs may come in the form of shame or
277. See Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 507 ("tamishment is not limited to seamy conduct"); see
also MCCARTHY, supra note 153, § 24:106 ("Some cases indicate that 'tamishment' may also include use
in a context which, while not inherently 'unwholesome,' is out of keeping with plaintiff's high quality
image.").
Customers or prospective customers will see the plaintiff's mark used by other persons to identify
other sources on a plethora of different goods and services. The unique and distinctive significance
of the mark to identify and distinguish one source may be diluted and weakened. But no confusion
as to source, sponsorship, affiliation, or connection has occurred.
Id. § 24:68.
278. See Bradford, supra note 199, at 50-5 1.
279. In this important respect, the case for control over semiotic meaning is much stronger with
respect to individual identities than it is for other intangible objects. Madonna's interest in control over the
text of her identity is a direct function of her humanity. While the identity she projects may or may not
reveal that true identity, she stands to bear the costs of whatever image she projects and what it says about
her character. Since those costs will include non-economic, emotional costs, they are not amenable to
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embarrassment, or simply discomfort at having been used for a purpose
inconsistent with their values. With respect to these non-economic costs, it
may not be important that the use objected to was commercial. While some
will surely object to any commercialization, the harm for many others will be
a function of the particular use that was made.
D. The Claim's Limitations
Not every third-party use of an individual's identity will suggest
sponsorship or endorsement or attempt to rework the meaning of her identity.
Many uses of an individual's identity are merely referential. Since celebrity
personas are "packed with a rich set of connotations that are understood
widely, they play a crucial role in the genesis and transmission of culture."28
Some uses then may simply draw on the cultural meaning of their time in
order to communicate, without risk of redefining that meaning.28 Uses that
simply reference the meaning without trying to redefine it or suggest
endorsement do not violate an interest in autonomous self-definition because
they do not create any new meaning, nor do they blur the meaning of the
original. In fact, those uses are likely to reinforce the meaning an identity has
already accrued. This is precisely the theory upon which the trademark
defense of nominative fair use is based.282 Ironically, by recognizing
nominative fair use, trademark law, which protects symbols that in many
instances derive their value from significantly more labor than celebrity
balancing against the benefits that accrue to others. The meaning associated with other works of authorship
or trade symbols, by contrast, is entirely constructed. Any costs suffered by an author or creator whose
symbol is re-coded are economic and therefore susceptible to balancing against non-owner interests.
280. Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 129-30. Dreyfuss, like Madow, is right to note the communicative
significance of identity, but she, again like Madow, goes too far in arguing that privatization of control over
such resources "can disturb the dynamics that are crucial to democracy." Id. at 139-40.
281. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54,
'
DUKE L.J. 1, 139-43 (2004) (noting that celebrity identities have symbolic meaning and many uses do not
seek to exploit a celebrity to sell products but use an identity as a metaphorical hook).
282. Hoffman v. Capital Cities ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2001) (allowing
magazine to use photograph of Dustin Hoffman as his character from the movie Tootsie); New Kids on the
Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing nominative fair use
defense where (1) the product or service in question is one not readily identifiable without use of the
trademark; (2) the defendant uses only so much of the mark as is reasonably necessary to identify the
product or service; and (3) the defendant does nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder). The nominative fair use defense also protects First
Amendment interests. Thus, by defining the scope of identity appropriation claims to allow for certain
kinds of uses, we can reduce, if not eliminate, the potential First Amendment conflict.
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identities, tolerates much more copying than the right of publicity in its
current form.283
The use at issue in Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.284 provides a
good example of the type of referential uses that should be beyond the scope
of the re-conceptualized claim. In that case, the defendant ran a television
commercial during one of the broadcasts of the NCAA basketball tournament
using the name by which Kareem Abdul-Jabbar was formerly known, Lew
Alcindor. The court described the commercial as follows:
A disembodied voice asks, "How 'bout some trivia?" This question is followed by the
appearance of a screen bearing the printed words, "You're Talking to the Champ." The
voice then asks, "Who holds the record for being voted the most outstanding player of
this tournament?" In the screen appear the printed words, "Lew Alcindor, UCLA, '67,
'68, '69." Next, the voice asks, "Has any car made the 'Consumer Digest's Best Buy'
list more than once? [and responds:] The Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight has." A seven-
second film clip of the automobile, with its price, follows. During the clip, the voice
says, "In fact, it [has] made that list three years in a row. And now you can get this
Eighty-Eight special edition for just $18,995." At the end of the clip, a message appears
in print on the screen: "A Definite First Round Pick," accompanied by the voice saying,
"it's your money." A final printed message appears: "Demand Better, 88 by
Oldsmobile.""2 5
The court found the use of Abdul-Jabbar's former name to violate his
right of publicity even though it appears simply as a culturally communicative
device. Indeed, the answer to the question "[w]ho holds the record for being
voted the most outstanding player of this tournament?" seems irrelevant.
Whatever the answer, the rest of the analogy follows.286 Moreover, Abdul-
Jabbar's only argument that the car company "reworked" his image is that
they used the name by which he was known prior to converting to Islam." 7
It seems implausible that factual statements about his athletic career from
before he changed his name in any way suggest anything about his current
283. See Clark v. Am. Online, Inc., No. CV-98-5650, 2000 WL 33535712 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30,2000)
(granting AOL's motion for summary judgment on Dick Clark's trademark claims based on AOL's use of
Dick Clark's name on promotional mailings, finding that the use was nominative fair use, yet denying
AOL's motion for summary judgment on Dick Clark's right of publicity claim based on the exact same
use).
284. 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996).
285. Id. at 409.
286. Consequently, there is a reasonable argument that the use should not have been sanctioned even
under current law. If the answer to the question was not important, then perhaps it was not the value of
Abdul-Jabbar's identity that General Motors was exploiting.
287. Id. at 416. Abdul-Jabbar claimed that, if people believed he endorsed the use, they would
believe that he had rejected his Muslim name.
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beliefs. At the very least, however, Abdul-Jabbar should have been required
to prove that this use suggested his endorsement or somehow affected
perception of him.288
There are also constraints in the formulation I propose that should caution
against over extension of the claim against destabilizing uses. Implicit in my
formulation is a sense of "other-ness." The harm of identity appropriation is
a result of an association between the individual and some "other"--a
company, a product, or a service, for example. Assuming that the information
contained in critical commentary or news reporting is true,289 the reports are
not creating meaning as much as revealing it. As a result, those reports do not
prevent an individual from making the choices by which others evaluate them.
Rather, news reports only shed light on the choices the individual has made.
Uses that create an association with another company, or its products or
services, on the other hand, do much more than reveal choices. Thus, there is
an important distinction to be made between the commercial uses subject to
the re-conceptualized identity appropriation claim I propose and traditional
non-commercial uses.
Likewise, the "other-ness" constraint should pose serious difficulties to
celebrities who bring claims against those who make or sell merchandise
bearing their images. Merchandising uses, like the Arnold Schwarzenegger
bobblehead dolls, treat the celebrity identity more or less the same as the
product itself. In those cases, there arguably is no "other" with which the
individual could be associated. Thus, to prevail, the individual would have to
demonstrate that others incorrectly believed she was responsible for
commercialization at all. For many celebrities, that will be a tall order, given
the extent to which they already commercialize their identity.
These are only some of the natural limits of a claim based on an interest
in autonomous self-definition. There may also be situations where other
values, in particular First Amendment values, outweigh the individual's
autonomy interest. I recognize that likelihood and leave to others the job of
determining how to resolve the conflicts. By re-orienting the claim as one
intended to protect autonomy, however, one can recognize natural limits of the
claim, which should result in less frequent conflicts.
288. Although Abdul-Jabbar claimed as much in the context of his trademark claim, the court did
not require any proof, and its discussion is cursory at best. See id. at 416. Undoubtedly the court was
motivated in part by the fact that current right of publicity law requires no such proof.
289. If the statement is not true, then the individual would have slander or libel claims available to
her, subject to the restrictions of those claims and of the First Amendment.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Legal protection against unauthorized uses of an individual's identity has
grown significantly over the last fifty years as it has relentlessly pursued
economic value. It has pursued value because a false distinction between the
harms suffered by private citizens and celebrities seemingly left celebrities
without a privacy claim for commercial use of their identities. But the
normative case for awarding individuals the economic value of their identities
has been based on an unpersuasive application of Lockean labor theory since
celebrities do not need additional incentives to invest in either their native
skills or in developing their personas. While the prevailing justification is
inadequate, as are other theories offered by supporters, courts and
commentators have long ignored an important interest implicated by
commercial use of identity that is shared by every individual. Because the
things with which individuals choose to associate reflect the way they wish to
be perceived, unauthorized use of one's identity in connection with products
or services threatens to define that individual to the world. There are costs to
whatever meaning we project, and those costs are borne uniquely by the
individual. It is that interest, and only that interest, that the law should seek
to protect. Moving in that direction would not only lead to a coherent body
of law, but it would provide natural limits for a claim that is currently
limitless. This article is intended to move the law in that direction.
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